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We provide a general non-parametric formula for aggregating microeconomic
shocks in general equilibrium economies with distortions such as taxes, markups,
frictions to resource reallocation, and nominal rigidities. We show that the macroe-
conomic impact of a shock can be boiled down into two components: its “pure”
technology effect; and its effect on allocative efficiency arising from the associated
reallocation of resources, which can be measured via changes in factor income shares.
We also derive a formula showing how these two components are determined by
structural microeconomic parameters such as elasticities of substitution, returns to
scale, factor mobility, and network linkages. Overall, our results generalize those
of Solow (1957) and Hulten (1978) to economies with distortions. To demonstrate
their empirical relevance, we pursue different applications, focusing on markup dis-
tortions. For example, we operationalize our non-parametric results and show that
improvements in allocative efficiency account for about 50% of measured TFP growth
over the period 1997-2015. We also implement our structural results and conclude that
eliminating markups would raise TFP by about 40%, increasing the economywide cost
of monopoly distortions by two orders of magnitude compared to the famous 0.1%
estimates of Harberger (1954).
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1 Introduction
The foundations of macroeconomics rely on Domar aggregation: changes in a constant-
returns-to-scale index are approximated by a sales-weighted average of the changes in its
components.1 Hulten (1978), building on the work of Solow (1957), provided a rationale
for using Domar aggregation to interpret the Solow residual as a measure of aggregate
















where Y is GDP, L f is the supply of factor f , Λ f is its of total income share in GDP, TFPi is
the TFP of producer i, λi is its sales as a share of GDP.
Although Hulten’s theorem is most prominent for its use in growth accounting, where
it is employed to measure movements in the economy’s production possibility frontier, it
is also the benchmark result in the resurgent literature on the macroeconomic impact of
microeconomic shocks in mutisector models and models with production networks.2
The non-parametric power of Hulten’s theorem comes from exploiting a macro-
envelope condition resulting from the first welfare theorem. It requires that the equi-
librium allocation be Pareto-efficient. When it is not, Hulten’s theorem generally fails.3
Our paper generalizes Hulten’s theorem beyond efficient economies, and provides
aggregation results for economies with arbitrary neoclassical production functions, input-
output networks, and distortion wedges. Rather than relying on a macro-envelope con-
dition like the first welfare theorem, our results are built on micro-envelope conditions:
namely that all producers are cost minimizers. As a byproduct, they suggest a new and
structurally interpretable decomposition of the Solow residual into “pure” changes in
technology and changes in allocative efficiency. Our results provide a unified framework
1Although we refer to this idea as Domar aggregation, after Evesy Domar (1961), the basic idea of using
sales shares to weight changes in a price or quantity can be traced back at least to the early 18th Century
writer William Fleetwood. We refer to this idea as Domar aggregation, since he was the first to propose
it in the context we are interested in: creating an index of aggregate technical change from measures of
microeconomic technical change.
2See for example Gabaix (2011), Acemoglu et al. (2012), Carvalho and Gabaix (2013), Di Giovanni et al.
(2014), Baqaee and Farhi (2017) amongst others.
3See for example the papers by Basu and Fernald (2002), Jones (2011), Jones (2013), Bigio and La’O
(2016), Baqaee (2016), or Liu (2017) who explicitly link their inefficient models with the failure of Hulten’s
result. Some papers which study distorted networked economies (but place less of a focus on how their
results compare to Hulten’s), are Grassi (2017), Caliendo et al. (2017), Bartelme and Gorodnichenko (2015).
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for analyzing the effects of distortions and misallocation in general equilibrium economies,
the study of which is the subject of a vibrant literature, recently reinvigorated by Restuccia
and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009).4
Loosely speaking, when a producer becomes more productive, the impact on aggre-
gate TFP can be broken down into two components. First, given the initial distribution
of resources, the producer increases its output, and this in turn increases the output of
its direct and indirect customers; we call this the “pure” technology effect. Second, the
distribution of resources across producers shifts in response to the shock, increasing some
producers’ output and reducing that of others; we call this the change in allocative effi-
ciency. In efficient economies, changes in allocative efficiency are zero to a first order, and
so the overall effect characterized by Hulten (1978) boils down to the “pure” technology
effect. In inefficient economies, changes in allocative efficiency are nonzero in general.
Our theoretical contribution is to fully characterize the macroeconomic impact of microe-
conomic shocks as well as their decomposition into “pure” technology effects and changes
in allocative efficiency in inefficient economies.
We present both ex-post and ex-ante results. The ex-post reduced-form results are
fully non-parametric and do not require any information about the microeconomic pro-
duction functions besides input-output expenditure shares. The downside of these results
is that they depend on the observation of factor income shares before and after the shock.
The second set of results are ex-ante structural results. Although they do not necessitate
ex-post information, they require information about microeconomic elasticities of substi-
tution. Using this information in conjunction with input-output expenditure shares, we
can deduce the implied changes in factor income shares. As a side benefit, our ex-ante
results determine how factor income shares respond to shocks for a general neoclassical
production structure, which is a question of independent interest in studies of inequality.5
To demonstrate the empirical relevance and the scope of applicability of our frame-
work, we put it to use to answer four different questions. The first three questions focus
on markups as a source of distortions, which we find particularly interesting in light of
the accumulating evidence that average markups have increased over the past decades in
4Some other prominent examples are Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Banerjee and Duflo (2005), Chari
et al. (2007), Guner et al. (2008), Buera et al. (2011), Epifani and Gancia (2011), Fernald and Neiman (2011),
Buera and Moll (2012), D’Erasmo and Moscoso Boedo (2012), Bartelsman et al. (2013), Caselli and Gennaioli
(2013), Neiman and Karabarbounis (2014), Oberfield (2013), Peters (2013), Reis (2013), Asker et al. (2014),
Hopenhayn (2014), Moll (2014), Midrigan and Xu (2014), Sandleris and Wright (2014), Edmond et al. (2015),
and Gopinath et al. (2017).
5See, for example, Piketty (2014), Barkai (2016), Elsby et al. (2013), Gutierrez (2017), Rognlie (2016).
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the US.6 The fourth question studies nominal rigidities.
1. How have changes in allocative efficiency contributed to measured TFP growth in
the US over the past 20 years?
We use our ex-post reduced-form results to propose a new decomposition of mea-
sured TFP growth as captured by the Solow residual into a “pure” technology effect
and an allocative efficiency effect.7 Our decomposition has a structural interpreta-
tion as a local counterfactual, since we measure changes in allocative efficiency as
the gap that opens up between the equilibrium allocation and a passive allocation
which does not allow for the reallocation of resources. Although our decomposition
shares the same objectives as the one provided by Basu and Fernald (2002), it is
different. We compare these two decompositions in Section 2.7 and argue why we
find ours preferable.
We implement our Solow residual decomposition in the US over the period 1997-
2014. Focusing on markups as a source of distortions, we find that the improvement
in allocative efficiency accounts for about 50% of the cumulated Solow residual.
This occurs despite the fact that average markups have been increasing. A rough
intuition for this surprising result is that average markups have been increasing
primarily due to an across-firms composition effect, where firms with high markups
have been getting larger, and not a within-firm increase in markups.8 From a social
perspective, these high-markup firms were too small to begin with, and so the
reallocation of factors towards them has improved allocative efficiency and TFP.
2. What are the gains from reducing markups in the US, and how have these gains
changed over time?
Using our ex-ante structural results, we find that in the US in 2014, eliminating
markups would raise aggregate TFP by about 40%. This increases the estimated
cost of monopoly distortions by two orders of magnitude compared to the famous
6See Barkai (2016) and Caballero et al. (2017) for arguments using aggregate data, and Gutierrez (2017),
and De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017) for evidence using firm-level data.
7There is also an additional effect, reminiscent of Hall (1990), due to the fact that the Solow residual
does not weigh changes in factor shares correctly in the presence of distortions.
8This is consistent with Autor et al. (2017) who argue that the labor share of income has decreased
because more low labor share firms have become larger, and not because the labor share has declined within
firms.
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estimates of 0.1% of Harberger (1954).9 Essentially, the reasons for this dramatic
difference are that we use firm-level data, whereas Harberger only had access to
sectoral data, and that the dispersion of markups is higher across firms within a
sector than across sectors. Moreover, the relevant elasticity of substitution is higher
in our exercise than in Harberger’s since it applies across firms within a sector rather
than across sectors. Finally, we properly take into account the input-output structure
of the economy to aggregate the numbers in all industries whereas Harberger focused
on manufacturing.
Like Harberger, our result measures only the static gains from eliminating markups,
holding fixed technology, abstracting away from the possibility that lower markups
may reduce entry and innovation. In other words, even if markups play an important
role in incentivizing entry and innovation, their presence also distorts the allocation
of resources, and this latter effect is what we quantify.
Interestingly, we also find that the gains from reducing markups have increased
since 1997. Roughly speaking, this occurs because the dispersion in markups has
increased over time. This finding may appear to contradict our conclusion that
allocative efficiency has made a positive contribution to measured TFP growth over
the period. The resolution is that these results are conceptually different: one is
about the contribution of changes in allocative efficiency to measured TFP growth
along the observed equilibrium path of the economy, while the other one is about
the comparison of the distance from the efficient production possibility frontier at
the beginning and at the end of the sample. This distinction highlights the subtleties
involved in defining and interpreting different notions of allocative efficiency.
3. How do markups affect the macroeconomic impact and diversification of microeco-
nomic shocks?
Our ex-ante structural results allow us to conclude that markups materially affect
the impact of microeconomic productivity and markup shocks on output, both at the
sector and at the firm level. They amplify some shocks and attenuate others. On the
whole, we find that output is more volatile than in a competitive model, especially
with respect to firm-level shocks.
9Harberger’s result had a profound impact on the economics discipline by providing an argument for
de-emphasizing microeconomic inefficiencies in comparison to Keynesian macroeconomic inefficiencies.
This impact is perhaps best illustrated by Tobin’s famous quip that “it takes a heap of Harberger triangles
to fill an Okun gap”.
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4. What are the macroeconomic impact of monetary shocks and microeconomic shocks
in a model with sticky prices?
We can use our framework to answer this question by leveraging the observation that
one can always model sticky prices as endogenous markups which adjust to ensure
that nominal prices stay fixed. We characterize the effects of aggregate monetary
shock and microeconomic productivity shocks. Focusing here on a money shock,
we decompose the impact into the traditional demand effects and the oft-neglected
allocative-efficiency effects on TFP.
Typically, models with sticky prices are linearized around an efficient steady state,
which ensures that reallocation terms disappear. We use our framework to study
the model’s behavior away from the efficient steady-state using empirically esti-
mated steady-state markups, and with a realistic microeconomic production struc-
ture featuring input-output connections, complementarities in production, and sub-
stitutability among heterogenous firms within an industry.
The size and direction of the TFP effects of monetary shocks depend crucially on
the correlation pattern between price-stickiness and the level of markups. They
can be large and positive and if goods with higher markups have stickier prices, as
suggested by a class of models featuring variable desired markups and menu costs.
Despite their generality, our results have two important limitations. First, our basic
framework accommodates neoclassical production with decreasing or constant returns to
scale. It can also easily handle fixed costs, as long as production has constant or increasing
marginal cost. However, it is unable to deal with non-neoclassical production featuring
increasing returns such as those studied by Baqaee (2016), where by increasing returns, we
refer to a situation where marginal variable costs are decreasing in output. Towards the
end of the paper, we sketch how our results can be extended to cover such cases, when we
discuss entry and exit. Second, in this paper we focus on first-order approximations. We
show that under some conditions, the nonlinear analysis of efficient economies in Baqaee
and Farhi (2017) can be leveraged to characterize nonlinearities in the sort of inefficient
economies studied in this paper.
The outline of the paper is as follows: in Section 2, we set up the general model, and
we prove our main non-parametric results. We also discuss how to interpret these results,
and the data required to implement our formulae. In Section 3, we introduce a parametric
version of the general model and present our structural results. We use a model with CES
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production and consumption functions, with an arbitrary number of nests, input-output
patterns, returns to scale, and factors of production. In Section 4, we apply our results to
the data by performing non-parametric ex-post decompositions of the sources of growth
in the US, as well as structural exercises measuring the gains from markup reductions,
macroeconomic volatility arising from microeconomic shocks, and macroeconomic impact
of microeconomic shocks, in a calibrated model. As a final application, we show how are
results can be used to study the effects of monetary policy and productivity in a model
with nominal rigidities. In Section 5, we consider how our results can be extended to deal
with fixed costs, entry, and nonlinearities.
2 General Framework and Non-Parametric Results
We begin by setting up our general framework, and characterize how shocks to wedges
and productivity affect equilibrium output and TFP. We define our notion of change in
allocative efficiency and discuss its implementation and data requirements. We explain
how it leads to a new decomposition of the Solow residual into changes in “pure” tech-
nology and changes in allocative efficiency. We end by discussing the generality of our
setup and in particular its ability to handle elastic factor supply and demand shocks.
2.1 General Model and Competitive Benchmark
The baseline model consists of a representative consumer and heterogeneous producers of
different goods. Throughout, we model distortions via monopoly markups and wedges.
The wedges act like linear taxes, the revenues of which are rebated lump sum.10,11 Beyond
actual taxes, these wedges can also implicitly capture frictions preventing the reallocation
of resources. For example, they can capture credit constraints and they must then be
interpreted as the Lagrange multipliers on the constraints in the individual firms’ cost
minimization problem.
The utility function of the representative consumer is represented by a constant-returns
consumption function
C = C(c1, . . . , cN).
10If the taxes were not rebated, then they would act as reductions in productivity since resources would
actually be destroyed, and hence the first welfare theorem and Hulten’s theorem would still apply.
11The question of how the distribution of lump sum rebates across the consumer and the different
producers is merely an accounting convention, which is irrelevant to the economics of the problem, but
which matters for mapping the model to the data. We expand on this issue below.
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The existence of a constant-returns-to-scale aggregate consumption function allows us to
unambiguously define real GDP using the corresponding ideal price index.
The representative consumer faces the budget constraint12
N∑
i
(1 + τci )pici =
F∑
f




where pi is the price of good i, τci is the consumption wedge on good i, pii is the profits of
the producer of good i, τ is a net government transfer, and L f is a non-reproducible factor
f with wage w f .
For now, we assume that factor supply is inelastic. The output effects identified in
this section can therefore also be interpreted as aggregate TFP effects, and we use both
terminologies interchangeably. At the end of this section, we generalize our results to
cover the case with elastic factor supply and characterize the output effects when they
differ from aggregate TFP effects.
We assume that each good i is produced by producer i according to a constant-returns





(1 + τi1)p1, . . . , (1 + τiN)pN, (1 + τ
f





where Ai is a Hicks-neutral shock, τi j is an input-specific tax wedge, τ
f
i j is a factor-specific
tax wedge, and yi is the total output. The function Ci is the industry’s marginal cost
function. Although we assume that the cost function is constant-returns-to-scale, this
assumption is without loss of generality, since we can model decreasing returns to scale
by using producer-specific fixed factors.13 The producer charges an exogenous markup
µi over its marginal cost.14
12We assume the existence of a representative consumer mostly for expositional convenience. Our ex-
post reduced-form results could be generalized to cover the generic heterogenous consumers (as long as
real GDP is defined using the Laspeyre index), and our ex-ante structural results could be generalized to
cover heterogenous consumers with identical homothetic preferences.
13To see how decreasing returns can be modeled via fixed-factors, see, for example, page 16 in Varian
(1992). The case of increasing returns to scale is not nested by this setup; see Baqaee (2016), and the last
section of this paper, for an analysis of increasing returns to scale in production networks.
14With one exception, we do not attempt to endogenize markups in this paper. We see it as an important
direction for future research to marry the sort of input-output models that we analyze here with industrial
organization models of firm competition which generate endogenous markups. See for example Baqaee
(2016) and Grassi (2017) for steps in this direction. In these models, our framework can be used to trace out
the implications of these endogenous markups. The aforementioned exception arises in Section 4.3 when
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Remark (Accounting Convention). We assume that expenditures by i on inputs from j,
and the revenues of i, are recorded gross of taxes and markups. In the case where these
wedges are reduced-form representations of frictions like credit constraints, we adopt
the convention of writing expenditures gross of these implicit wedges.15 This is purely
a convention which does not change anything to the economics of the problem. Our
convention need not coincide with the accounting convention for expenditures adopted
in the data. In that case, the data must be converted into the format required by our
theory. This conversion is completely straightforward. For example, in the case of a credit
constraint which increases the rental rate of capital perceived by a firm but not its true
rental rate, the conversion requires inflating the firm’s expenditure on capital measured
in the data by a percentage equal to the equivalent implicit tax on capital given by the
Lagrange multiplier on the constraint in the cost minimization problem of the firm.
Remark (Markup-Wedge Equivalence). In this economy, we can always relabel the input-
output matrix in such a way as to represent a wedge as a markup or vice versa. Therefore,
going forward, we work with shocks to markups only with the understanding that this is
done without loss of generality. Any pattern of wedges can be represented as markups
by relabelling each input of each industry to be a new industry which charges a markup.
Similarly, any pattern of markups can be represented via output wedges.
Our goal in this paper is to understand how to aggregate microeconomic shocks.
Before stating our results, it is helpful to define some notation.
Definition 2.1 (Input-Output Matrix). Let Ω be the N × N matrix whose i jth element is





Let Ω˜ be the N×N matrix whose i jth element is equal to the elasticity of i’s marginal costs
relative to the price of j
Ω˜i j =
∂ log Ci





f w f Li f
.
The second equality follows from Shephard’s lemma, where xi j are inputs from j and Li f
we consider nominal rigidities and model them as endogenous variable markups required to keep certain
prices constant.
15See e.g. Bigio and La’O (2016).
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is factor type f used by the ith producer. Let
Ψ˜ = (I − Ω˜)−1
and
Ψ = (I −Ω)−1
denote the Leontief inverse of Ω˜ and Ω. Let α and α˜ denote the N× F matrices whose i f th
element is equal to i’s expenditures on factor f as a share of its total revenues and costs
respectively. Finally, let b be the N×1 vector whose ith element is equal to the household’s
expenditures on inputs from i as a share of total consumption
bi =
pici∑
j p jc j
.
The matrices Ω, α, and b are directly observable from input-output data (at the industry
level, and sometimes even at the firm-level using value-added-tax data). Unlike revenues
however, we do not typically directly observe costs, so the matrices Ω˜ and α˜ are not readily
observable. The link between Ω and Ω˜ is given by
Ω = µ−1Ω˜,
where µ is the diagonal matrix whose ith diagonal element corresponds to the ith markup
or wedge.
Throughout the paper, we find it convenient to consider each factor of production as
an industry in the input-output table. This means that the rows of the matrix Ω˜ either
sum to 1 (if that row corresponds to a good) or 0 (if the that row corresponds to a factor).
Given this normalization, the matrix of factor uses satisfies the simple relation α = α˜.
The following accounting market-clearing identity
piyi = pici +
∑
j
pixi j = biGDP +
∑
j







= b′(I −Ω)−1 = b′Ψ, (1)
where the sales of i as a share of GDP, denoted by λi, is called the Domar weight of
i. Although the Domar weight of i is directly observable as the sales over GDP, it can
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also be computed from the input-output matrix Ω and final demand b. For expositional
convenience, for a non-reproducible (factor) industry f we use Λ f instead of λ f to denote
its Domar weight, which is then simply the corresponding income share of this factor.
We can also define
λ˜′ = b′(I − Ω˜)−1 = b′Ψ˜
to be the vector of cost-based Domar weights. We choose the name cost-based Domar
weight for λ˜ to contrast it with the traditional revenue-based Domar weight λ. For a
non-reproducible (factor) industry f we use uppercase Λ˜ f instead of λ˜ f . Intuitively, λ˜k
measures the importance of k as a supplier to the household, both directly, and indirectly
as an intermediate input. It only depends on k’s role as a supplier rather than its role as a
consumer.16 This can be seen most clearly by writing
λ˜′ = b′I + b′Ω˜ + b′Ω˜2 + b′Ω˜3 + . . . ,
where the nth term in the geometric sum computes the set of paths of length n from each
producer to the household. When the economy is efficient (µ = I) — there are no markups
or wedges – it must be the case that λ˜ = λ. Hence, for an efficient economy, we observe
λ˜ directly as sales over GDP. In the presence of wedges or markups, λ˜ , λ, and so the
cost-based Domar weights are not directly observable from gross output data.
We can now state Hulten’s theorem for productivity shocks in efficient economies. In
fact, we can slightly generalize it to allow for the case where only the initial pre-shock
equilibrium is efficient. We also derive a simple extension for shocks to wedges.
Theorem 2.1 (Hulten 1978). When the initial pre-shock allocation is efficient with µ = I, we have
d log C
d log Ak




Our goal in this paper is to extend this result to cover the case when the initial pre-
shock equilibrium is inefficient. We begin by considering the impact of microeconomic
productivity shocks, and then extend the results to cover wedge/markup shocks.
To state our results, we will use the notion of cross-entropy, which loosely speaking, is
16The cost-based Domar weight is also sometimes referred to as the influence vector, since in a certain
class of models (like Jones, 2013), it maps micro productivity shocks to output. We avoid this language
since influence is a fairly ambiguous term, and while the cost-based Domar weights are often-times useful
in characterizing equilibria, they do not generically map productivity shocks to output. In other words,
they are not generically equivalent to “influence.”
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a measure of distance between distributions from information theory.17
Definition 2.2 (Cross Entropy). For two probability distributions P˜ and P over the set of
outcomes S, the cross-entropy between P˜ and P is




For a given change dP in the probability distribution for P, we denote by dH(P˜,P) =
H(P˜,P + dP) − H(P˜,P) the change in relative entropy relative to the fixed distribution
P˜. Similarly if P is indexed by x, then we denote by by dH(P˜,P)/dx = dH(P˜,Px)/dx the
derivative of the relative entropy of Px relative to the fixed distribution P˜.
We will apply these definitions using the set of non-reproducible (factor) industries for
S, Λ˜ as the fixed probability distribution P˜, and Λ as the variable distribution P.18
2.2 Productivity Shocks
In this section, we extend Hulten (1978) for productivity shocks to cover the case when
the economy is inefficient.










d log Λ f
d log Ak
. (3)
Intuitively, in response to a productivity shock, two things can happen: first, given
the share of resources allocated across producers, more output is produced in response
to productivity; second, the share of resources allocated across producers can change in
response to changing productivity.
17Cross-entropy between two distributions is minimized when the two distributions are the same. This
definition is due to Claude Shannon (1948). Note that the Kullback and Leibler (1951) divergence is cross-
entropy plus a constant, so that d H(Λ˜,Λ) = d DKL(Λ˜||Λ) in our context.
18Note that
∑
f Λ˜ f = 1 so that we can indeed think of Λ˜ as a probability distribution. By contrast Λ is
typically not a probability distribution since
∑
f Λ f , 1 in general. However, we can always supplement Λ
with the pure profit share Λ f ∗ = 1 −∑ f Λ f accruing to an extra factor f ∗ for which the cost-based share is
zero Λ˜ f ∗ = 0.
19In the proof in the appendix, we also provide an explicit characterization of d H(Λ˜,Λ)/d log(Ak) in
terms of the structural characteristics of the production and consumption functions. We present this
characterization in the main body of the paper for the more special parametric version of the model in
Section 3.
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The first term λ˜k corresponds to the change in output in response to the productivity
shock, holding fixed the share of resources allocated to different producers. The second
term corresponds to the change resulting from movement in resources.
When the economy is efficient, the first term corresponds to the Domar weight of
industry k, and the second term is always equal to zero. The latter fact follows from
d(Λ˜,Λ) = d(Λ˜, Λ˜) =
∑
F Λ˜F d log Λ˜F = 0. In this case, this formula collapses to Hulten
(1978). In other words, when the economy is efficient, we can ignore the endogenous
changes in the reallocation of resources arising from the productivity shock. To a first order,
we can treat the (endogenous) share of resources allocated across producers to be constant.
This is a manifestation of the first welfare theorem, or equivalently a macroeconomic
envelope theorem. This logic fails when the equilibrium is inefficient. A nonzero second
term indicates that the first welfare theorem has failed, and measures the resulting change
in aggregate allocative efficiency.
Hence, Theorem 2.2 shows that we can boil down changes in misallocation arising
from microeconomic productivity shocks in an economy with an arbitrary neoclassical
production structure into an appropriately weighted average of the changes in factor
income shares.20 In particular, it is not necessary to track how the allocation of every
single good is changing across its users. Instead, it suffices to to track how factor income
shares change.
Theorem 2.2 implies that output increases when the distribution of factor income shares
Λ˜ gets further away from the cost-share of the factors Λ. This may seem surprising given
that Λ = Λ˜ at the efficient equilibrium, which maximizes output. However, the intuition
is simple: that Λ gets further away from Λ˜ means that the more (less) monopolistic parts
of the economy are receiving more (fewer) resources. This improves allocative efficiency,
since from a social perspective, the corresponding firms or sectors absorb too few (too
much) resources to begin with. For example, ceteris paribus, a decrease in all factor
income shares necessarily implies an improvement in allocative efficiency. To see an
explicit demonstration of this phenomenon, see Example 3.2.
20Since the landmark work of Theil (1967), changes in entropy have been used as a measure of changing




So far, we have focused on productivity shocks, but it turns out a very similar intuition
holds for shocks to markups, and hence also for other wedges given the general possibility
of capturing wedges as markups under relabelling discussed above.
Theorem 2.3 (Markup/Wedge Shocks). For markup/wedge shocks, we have
d log C
d logµk




d log Λ f
d logµk
. (4)
A markup shock acts much like the combination of a fictitious negative produc-
tivity shock combined with a fictitious shock to available factors. This is because a
markup shock, like a negative productivity shock, increases the price of the correspond-
ing good, which absent reallocation effects, increases the GDP deflator by the associated
cost-adjusted Domar weight. But compared to a negative productivity shock, a markup
shock also releases some resources which are reallocated to other parts of the economy,
thereby generating further changes in allocative efficiency. A remarkable feature of this
theorem is that all these changes in allocative efficiency are captured by the changes in
the factor income shares.
Although stated in terms of markups, this result also characterizes the response of
output to other distortion shocks τ. This follows from the observation that markup
shocks and wedge shocks are equivalent, up to a relabelling. Hence, Theorem 2.3 allows
to connect with the broader literature on misallocation like Restuccia and Rogerson (2008),
Hsieh and Klenow (2009), and in particular Jones (2013).21
21For example, for a factor wedge shock to factor k for producer l, we have
d log C
d log(1 + τ flk)
= −λ˜lαlk + d H(Λ˜,Λ)





d log Λ f ′
d log(1 + τ flk)
. (5)
Similar formulae hold for shocks to other wedges. In Appendix C, we describe the relabelling in
more detail. For reference, for an intermediate input wedge shock, we have d log C/d log(1 + τlk) =
−λ˜lω˜lk + d H(Λ˜,Λ)/d log(1 + τlk) and for a consumption wedge shock, we have d log C/d log(1 + τck) =
−bk +d H(Λ˜,Λ)/d log(1+τck). For each formula, the first term corresponds to the impact on the GDP deflator
holding fixed factor prices, and the second term measures the impact of the changing factor prices.
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2.4 Ex-post Decompositions: Aggregate TFP and Solow Residual
In this section, we show how to decompose time-series changes in aggregate TFP and
the Solow residual into “pure” technology changes and allocation efficiency changes.
We put together Theorems 2.2 and 2.3. For the purpose of this section, we introduce a
small but simple modification to allow for changes in factor supplies in order to separate
aggregate output and aggregate TFP. We denote the supply of factor f by L f and by L
the vector of factor supplies. The impact of a shock to the supply of a factor is given by
d log C/d log L f = Λ˜ f + d H(Λ˜,Λ)/d log L f = Λ˜ f −∑ f ′ Λ˜ f ′ d log Λ f ′/d log L f .
Proposition 2.4 (TFP Decomposition). To the first order, we can decompose aggregate TFP as
∆ log(Ct) − Λ˜′∆ log L︸                     ︷︷                     ︸
Aggregate TFP
≈ λ˜′t−1∆ log At︸        ︷︷        ︸
Technology
− λ˜′t−1∆ logµt − Λ˜′t−1∆ log Λt︸                            ︷︷                            ︸
Allocative efficiency
. (6)
The left-hand side of this expression, which we define to be aggregate TFP growth,
differs from the Solow residual since it weighs the change in L f by the cost-based Domar
weight Λ˜ f rather than the revenue-based Domar weight Λ f . This is consistent with Hall
(1990), who showed that for an aggregate production function, aggregate TFP should
weigh changes in factor inputs by their share of total cost rather than their share of total
revenue. In our context unlike in Hall’s, the equilibrium can be distorted given factor
supplies and there is no structural aggregate production function. We must weigh factors
by their cost-based Domar weight. Proposition 2.4 therefore unifies the approach of Hulten
(1978), who eschews aggregate production functions, but maintains efficiency, with that of
Hall (1990) who does not require efficiency but maintains aggregate production functions
and therefore ignores the allocative efficiency issues that most concern us.
Turning to the right-hand side, in the case of an efficient economy, the envelope
theorem implies that the reallocation terms are welfare-neutral (to a first order) and can be
ignored. Furthermore, the appropriate weights on the technology shocks λ˜ coincide with
the observable sales shares. In the presence of distortions, these serendipities disappear.
However, given the input-output expenditure shares across producers, the level of wedges
and their changes, and the changes in factor income shares, we can compute the right-
hand side of equation (6) without having to make any parametric assumptions. This is an
ex-post decomposition in the sense that it requires us to observe factor income shares and
factor supplies at the beginning and at the end of the period.
Proposition 2.4 also allows us to connect our results to the “revenue-based” Solow
15
residual defined by Basu and Fernald (2001):
∆ log Ct −Λ′t−1∆ log Lt ≈ λ˜′t−1∆ log At − λ˜′t−1∆ logµt − Λ˜′t−1∆ log Λt + (Λ˜t−1 −Λt−1)′∆ log Lt. (7)
The first three summands on the right hand side are the same as in Proposition 2.4 The last
summand corrects for the undercounting of the contribution of factors growth to output
growth, given that Λ˜ f ≥ Λ f .22
It is important to note that Proposition 2.4 can be used in contexts where productivity
or wedges are endogenous to some more primitive fundamental shocks, because these
endogenous changes are actually observed in the data.
2.5 Constant Misallocation
An important advantage of Proposition 2.4 is that, despite its low information requirement,
the decomposition it provides has a structural interpretation as a local counterfactual.
Specifically, we can interpret the changes in allocative efficiency term in equation (6)
as measuring the gap that opens up between the equilibrium allocation and a passive
allocation where the distribution of resources is not changed in response to a shock. The
passive allocation, which has constant allocative efficiency, isolates the “pure” technology
effect of the shock.
In this section, we define this passive allocation and establish its aforementioned
property. We also provide two examples where the passive allocation coincides with
the equilibrium allocation, and we identify the importance of cyclic graphs in generating
misallocation.
Passive Allocation
To define the passive allocation rule, consider an initial equilibrium with some distortions,
and imagine this economy is hit with some shocks to productivities d log A and markups
22The left-hand side of equation (7) is not the traditional Solow residual defined by Solow (1957). The
traditional Solow residual, unlike the version used by Basu and Fernald (2002), attributes all non-labor
income to capital (and has no room for profit income). Therefore, with only labor (L) and capital (K) as
factors, the traditional Solow residual would be
∆ log Ct − Λˆ′t−1∆ log Lt ≈ λ˜′t−1∆ log At − λ˜′t−1∆ logµt − Λ˜′t−1∆ log Λt + (Λ˜t−1 − Λˆt−1)′∆ log Lt, (8)
where ΛˆL = ΛL for labor and ΛˆK = 1−ΛL for capital. The key difference is that capital is weighed according
to 1 −ΛL and not to ΛK.
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d logµ. Suppose that if the physical output of some industry k increases by d log yk, then
that new output is proportionally divided amongst k’s customers according to their shares
in the initial equilibrium. In other words, d log xlk = d log ck = d log yk.23 Call the change
in output under this passive rule for allocating new resources d log Cp. We can show that
d log Cp = λ˜′ d log A. (9)
When the initial equilibrium is efficient, the passive and equilibrium output move
by the same amount d log Cp = d log C. Intuitively, as a consequence of the Envelope
theorem, the rule by which resources are reallocated is irrelevant up to a first order. On
the other hand, when the initial equilibrium is distorted, we know that
d log C = λ˜′ d log A − λ˜′ d logµ + d H(Λ˜,Λ) = λ˜′ d log A − λ˜′ d logµ −
∑
f
Λ˜ f d log Λ f .
Hence, the gap between the general equilibrium allocation and the passive allocation is
exactly what we call the change in allocative efficiency
d log C − d log Cp = −λ˜′ d logµ + d H(Λ˜,Λ) = −λ˜′ d logµ −
∑
f
Λ˜ f d log Λ f . (10)
We view this property as building considerable support for our definition of allocative
efficiency. Essentially, the passive allocation just scales the initial allocation proportion-
ately, without allowing any other form of reallocation through substitution. In this sense,
it constitutes a benchmark without changes in allocative efficiency, and so it stands a use-
ful yardstick against which to measure changes in allocative efficiency in the equilibrium
allocation.
Moreover, as we shall now see, there are cases where it should be unambiguous a priori
that there are no changes in allocative efficiency: acyclic economies, and Cobb-Douglas
economies. And these cases are correctly diagnosed by our definition: the equilibrium
allocation and the passive allocation coincide, and our measure of change in allocative
efficiency is zero.
23More formally, these proportional adjustments lead to a system of linear equations in d log yk and
d log xlk with forcing variables given by the shocks, and the passive allocation is the solution of this system.
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Acyclic Economies – No Misallocation
A case where misallocation plays no role is the case where the production network is an
acylic graph, as illustrated in Figure 1. The term acyclic here means that any two industries
are connected to one another by exactly at most one undirected path, so that each factor
and each good has a unique consumer. This implies that markups and wedges have no
effect on the allocation of resources, simply because there is no option to allocate a given
factor or good to different uses. In other words, misallocation requires cycles (non-trivial
undirected paths that connect a node back to itself) in the production network.
HH
· · ·1 N
· · ·F1 FK
· · · · · ·
Figure 1: An acyclic economy, where the solid arrows represent the flow of goods. The
factors are the green nodes. Each supplier (including factors) have at most one customer,
whereas a single customer may have more than one supplier. Economies without cycles
can be represented as directed trees with the household being the root.








An important consequence of this proposition, anticipated above, is that in acyclic
economies in which it is unambiguous a priori that there is no misallocation, our definition
of changes in allocative efficiency indeed identifies that there are no changes in allocative
efficiency in response to shocks.
Note that although the equilibrium allocation in this economy is efficient, Hulten’s
theorem still fails because the observed sales shares do not coincide with λ˜. In fact, due to
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double-marginalization (or, more generally, piling up of wedges), we can write examples
where λ and λ˜ can be arbitrarily different from one another. A stark illustration of the gap
between λ˜ and λ, drawn from Baqaee (2016), is a vertical economy shown in Figure 2, to
which we now turn.
HH 1 · · · N L
Figure 2: Vertical economy where the solid arrows represent the flow of goods. The flow
of profits and wages from firms to households has been suppressed in the diagram. The
sole factor for this economy is indexed by L.
Example 2.1 (Vertical Economy). Consider the economy depicted in Figure 2: only the
final industry N uses labor. Since the economy is acyclic, there is no reallocation term to
account for. Indeed, applying Propositions 2.6, we get
d log C
d log Ak
= λ˜k = 1,








For simplicity, assume that µi < 1 for all i. Then λ˜k = 1 > λk. The gap between the cost-
based Domar weight λ˜k and the revenue-based Domar weight λk can be arbitrarily large.
Indeed, with high enough markups or long enough chains, we can drive the revenue-
based Domar weight λk to 0, while keeping λ˜k constant at 1, which represents an extreme
failure of Hulten’s theorem.
Cobb-Douglas Economies – Constant Misallocation
A second case where there are no changes in allocative efficiency is the case of a Cobb-
Douglas economies with productivity shocks. In this case, in response to a shock, all
expenditure shares are constant and the equilibrium allocation coincides with the passive
allocation. Hence, although unlike in acyclic economies, resources can be misallocated,
the extent of misallocation does not change in response to shocks.
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Proposition 2.6 (Cobb-Douglas Economies). Consider the case where the consumption and all




This result follows immediately from Theorem 2.2, and the fact that d H(Λ˜,Λ)/d log Ak =
0, since for a Cobb-Douglas economy, factor income shares do not respond to productivity
shocks.24
Without markups or wedges, λ˜k = λk and we recover Hulten’s theorem. However, in
the presence of wedges, λ˜k can be arbitrarily different to the Domar weight λk. The gap
between λ˜k and λk opens up due to double-marginalization (or, more generally, piling
up of wedges). Even with symmetric uniform markups, the economy will typically fea-
ture misallocation, since asymmetries in the input-output network will result in different
industries being differentially exposed to markups. 25
Although in a Cobb-Douglas economy, the equilibrium allocation responds to a pro-
ductivity shock exactly as the passive allocation, it does not in response to markup/wedge
shocks, and so these latter shocks do generate changes in allocative efficiency. We return
to how output responds to markup/wedge shocks in the Cobb-Douglas special case in
Section 3.1.
2.6 Implementing the Results
Implementing our formulas using actual data requires more care than when handling
efficient economies. Over and above the difficulties involved with coming up with re-
liable empirical measures of distortions, there are two important issues that have to be
confronted: (1) identification of the factors of production; (2) and aggregation of the data
at hand. We discuss them in turn.
24Liu (2017) shows that a formula like the one in Proposition 2.6 can hold even when the consumption
and production functions are not necessarily Cobb-Douglas. This result follows from the fact that in his
model, d H(Λ˜,Λ) ≡ 0, since there are no profits and labor’s share of income is always equal to 1, so that
allocative efficiency does not change. Intuitively, in that model, distortions dissipate resources (through
excess entry, or technological transactions costs), so that they behave similarly to productivity shocks where
the sales shares are mismeasured (since expenditures are recorded net of the destruction, they need to be
adjusted to take the cost of the destroyed resources into account).
25The observation that for Cobb-Douglas economies with markups or wedges, d log C/d log Ak = λ˜k , λk
is not new to this paper. For instance, see Jones (2013) for generic wedges in a Cobb-Douglas economy, or
Bigio and La’O (2016), who study a Cobb-Douglas economy with credit constraints that manifest as wedges,
and the Cobb-Douglas special case of Baqaee (2016), who studies a Cobb-Douglas economy with markups.
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Identification of the Factors
The first issue we have to confront when working with inefficient models is that we have
to identify the factors of production. For an efficient economy, we do not need to worry
about reallocation of resources, and hence we do not need to specifically identify and track
the changes in factor income shares. For an inefficient economy, we must take a stance on
this issue. The most challenging problem here is to identify “fixed” or quasi-fixed factors
of production – namely, those factors whose presence gives rise to decreasing returns to
scale for a producer, and whose factor payments need to be separated from pure profits.
In other words, when the equilibrium is inefficient, we need to take a stance about
whether factors are “stuck” due to technological restrictions or market imperfections.
Intuitively, if labor does not flow from mining into secretarial services, treating miners
and secretaries as two separate factors or a single factor will affect the implied measure of
allocative efficiency. In mapping the model to the data, we need to choose whether two
factors that receive a different wage are being paid different wages due to frictions, or due
to the fact that there are technological differences between the factors. These are issues
that we do not have to confront when the equilibrium is efficient, since the consequences
of reallocation are zero to the first order.
Data Aggregation Level
The second issue is the aggregation of the data before it reaches the researcher. Up to
a first-order approximation, efficient economies have a tremendously useful aggregation
property: for a common productivity shock A to a collection of producers S ⊂ {1, . . . ,N},
the first order impact of the shock is given by d C/d log A =
∑
i∈S piyi. In other words, the
total sales of all producers in S will yield the impact of an aggregate shock to all producers
in S.26 In other words, we only need to observe sales data at the level of disaggregation at
which the shocks are occurring.
This aggregation property does not hold for distorted economies, even in the Cobb-
Douglas or acyclic cases where we do not need to account for changes in allocative
efficiency. Unlike sales, cost-based Domar weights λ˜ are not directly observable, and
instead need to be computed from input-output data at the level of disaggregation at
which the markups and wedges appear. If wedges apply at the firm or establishment
26Baqaee and Farhi (2017) present an important caveat to this observation: this first-order approximation
can be highly unreliable in certain contexts.
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level, then firm or establishment-level input-output data is in general necessary. See
Appendix D for a worked-out example.27
2.7 Comparison with the Basu-Fernald Decomposition
In their seminal work, Basu and Fernald (2002) provide an alternative decomposition of
aggregate TFP changes into “pure” technology changes and changes in misallocation for
economies with markups. Their “pure” technology term, like ours, is a weighted average
of technology changes ∆ log Akt for each producer. The weight wkt/(1 − µktsMkt) attached
to a given producer k is just its share in value added wkt multiplied by a correction
1/(1 − µktsMkt) involving its intermediate input share in costs sMkt and its markup µkt.
These weights therefore differ from the cost-based Domar weights λ˜kt prescribed by our
decomposition. In fact, the information required to calculate their weights — the value
added share, intermediate-input share, and markup of each producer — is not enough
in general to calculate the cost-based Domar weights — which requires in addition the
whole input-output matrix. As a result, their decomposition is different from ours.
We have already independently argued the merits of our approach. We also think that
it better captures the distinction between “pure” technology and misallocation than Basu
and Fernald’s. One extreme but illuminating example regarding this comparison is the
case of productivity shocks in acyclic economies with markups. In this case, the Basu-
Fernald decomposition detects “pure” changes in technology and changes in misallocation,
even though these economies feature efficient equilibria and have no misallocation.28
By contrast, as already explained above, our approach only detects changes in “pure”
technology and finds no change in allocative efficiency. See Appendix D for a worked-out
example.
27In Section 4, we apply our results in the case of markups using firm-level data. Firms are grouped into
industries. We make the assumption that all firms within an industry have the same production function but
have heterogenous markups and productivities. Given this assumption, we can recover, using the structure
of the model, the input-output data at the firm level (which we do not observe) from the input-output data
at the industrial level and the joint distribution of markups and size at the firm level within an industry
(which we observe).
28More precisely, in this case, the change in misallocation detected by their decomposition shows up in
their “materials-misallocation” term.
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2.8 Extensions to Basic Framework
The basic set up of the model abstracts away from biased technical change, demand
shocks, elastic factor supplies, and capital accumulation, as well as adjustment costs and
capacity utilization. In this section, we explain how to apply or modify our results to
take these features into account. We also explain how to use our results in cases where
markups/wedges and productivities are endogenous.
Biased Technical Change and Demand Shocks
Although the model is written in terms of Hicks-neutral productivity shocks, this is done
without loss of generality. We can always capture non-neutral productivity shocks, say
factor-augmenting shocks, by relabelling the relevant factor of a given producer to be a
separate industry. Then, Hicks-neutral productivity shocks to that industry would be
identical to factor-biased productivity shocks in the original model.
Demand shocks can also be modeled in this way. To capture demand shocks, we can
use a mixture of consumer-specific productivity shocks: so for instance, an increase in
demand by i for inputs from j can be modelled as a positive productivity shock when j
sells to i and a series of negative productivity shocks when anyone besides j sells to i. In
an efficient economy, Hulten’s theorem implies that such changes in the composition of
demand have no effect on aggregate TFP, since the positive demand shock cancels out the
negative demand shock to the rest. However, in a model with distortions, the change in
the composition of demand can affect TFP by changing allocative efficiency.
Elastic Factor Supplies
To model elastic factor supplies, let Gk(wk/Pc,C) be the supply of factor k, where wk/Pc is
the real price of the factor and C is aggregate consumption. Let ζ f = ∂ log G f/∂ log(wk/Pc)
be the (Marshallian) elasticity of of the supply of factor f to its real wage, and γ f =
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With inelastic factors, a decline in factor income shares, ceteris paribus, increases out-
put since it represents a reduction in the misallocation of resources and an increase in
aggregate TFP. With elastic factor supply, the output effect is dampened by the pres-
ence of 1/(1 + ζ f ) < 1. This is due to the fact that a reduction in factor income shares,
while increasing aggregate TFP, reduces factor supply, which in reduces output. Hence,
when factors are elastic, increases in allocative efficiency from assigning more resources
to more monopolistic producers are counteracted by reductions in factor supplies due to
the associated suppression of factor demand.29
For the rest of the paper, unless explicitly specified, we focus on TFP effects and so
we work with the version of the model where factors are inelastically supplied. This is
primarily for clarity: whenever the crux of the argument does not hinge on having elastic
factor supplies, we assume it away. In some specific cases, like when discussing the effects
of monetary policy, elastic factor supply is important, and then we reintroduce it.
Capital Accumulation, Adjustment Costs, and Capacity Utilization
Our benchmark model treats the capital stock in the economy as being exogenously
determined. In principle, we could add capital accumulation into the model in the usual
Arrow-Debreu manner: treat goods in different time periods as different goods. Then, we
could model the process of capital accumulation via intertemporal production functions
that transform goods in one period into goods in other periods. We could also handle
technological frictions to the reallocation of factors such as adjustment costs and variable
capacity utilization. Our formulae would apply to these economies without change, but
of course, in such a world, the Domar weight of each producer would now be expressed
in net-present value terms.
29In the limit where factor supplies become infinitely elastic, the influence of the allocative efficiency
effects disappear from output, since more factors can always be marshaled on the margin at the same
real price. To see this, consider the case with a single factor called labor, and factor supply function
GL(w/Pc,C) = (w/PcC)ν, which can be derived from a standard labor-leisure choice model. In this case,
γL = −ζL = ν, and so equation (14) implies that d log C/d log Ak = λ˜k + 1/(1 + ν) d H(Λ˜L,ΛL)/d log Ak. When
labor supply becomes infinitely elastic ν → ∞, this simplifies to d log C/d log Ak = λ˜k, so that changes in
allocative efficiency have no effect on output, even though they affect TFP.
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Endogenous Productivities and Markups
Our results are comparative statics on the macroeconomic impact of a microeconomic
productivity or markup/wedge shock, holding fixed all other markups/wedges and pro-
ductivity levels. Of course, these results can then be used to study situations where several
microeconomic shocks occur at the same time. They can also be used in contexts where
productivity or wedges are endogenous to some more primitive fundamental shock.
In the latter case, our results can be operationalized in two different ways. First, they
can be used ex post without any modification because these endogenous changes are
actually observed in the data, as explained in Section 2.4. Second, they can combined
ex ante with an application of the chain rule characterizing the derivatives of the vectors
of microeconomic productivities and markups to these more fundamental shocks arising
from some additional structure imposed on the model. We refer the reader to Section 3.4
for a detailed discussion of our ex-post reduced-form and of our ex-ante structural results
in such contexts.
3 Parametric Model and Structural Results
Our results so far are non-parametric, but we can draw out some additional intuition
by specializing them to the case of an arbitrary nested CES economy, with an arbitrary
number of nests, weights, and elasticities. Working through this parametric class of
models greatly helps build intuition about the way the model works, and allows us to
calibrate a structural model for quantifying the mechanisms that we identify.
We proceed in stages. After setting up the parametric model, we start with the one-
factor case, which a fortiori, implies constant returns to scale, since by convention we
model decreasing returns using fixed factors. The one-factor case is illustrative for show-
ing how the production network, interacting with elasticities of substitution, can affect
the degree of misallocation in the economy. Next, we extend our results to the case with
multiple factors/decreasing returns. Finally, we show how to use our results in models
where productivities and wedges are endogenous.
3.1 Parametric Model Setup
Any CES economy with a representative consumer, an arbitrary numbers of nests, elastic-
ities, and intermediate input use, can be re-written in standard form, which turns out to be
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more convenient to study. In this section, we first define the notion of standard form and
clarify the mapping of any CES economy to its standard form. We then fully characterize
the behavior of such economies.
Throughout this section, variables with over-lines are normalizing constants equal
to the values in steady-state. Since we are interested in log changes, the normalizing
constants are irrelevant.30
An economy in standard form is defined by a tuple (Ω,θ, µ,F) where Ω is the (N + 1)×
(N + 1) input-output matrix whose i jth element is equal to ωi j, the vector of elasticites θ is
an (N + 1 − F) × 1 vector whose ith element is θi, the vector of markups is µ, and F is the
number of factors.
The F factors are modeled as non-reproducible goods, which we denote with uppercase




For the non-reproducible industries, we set theirω f j = 0 for all j. The other N + 1−F other
















where xlk are intermediate inputs from l used by k. Each producer charges a markup over







where c0 is the consumption good. We set ωi0 = 0 for all i.
Through a relabelling, this structure can represent any CES economy with an arbitrary
pattern of nests and wedges and elasticities. Intuitively, by relabelling each CES aggregator
to be a new industry, we can have as many nests as we like. Wedges on any specific input,
say inputs from industry i sold to industry j, can be achieved by relabelling that input
to be a new industry and assigning a markup to that industry. This relabelling amounts
30We use normalized quantities since it simplifies calibration, and clarifies the fact that CES aggregators
are not unit-less.
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to changing the way the input-output table is written, and since we work with arbitrary
input-output tables, we can do this without loss of generality (see Appendix C for a
concrete example).
Given the revenue-based input-output matrix Ω and the vector of markups µ, we can
define, exactly as in Section 2.1, the cost-based input-output matrix Ω˜, the revenue-based
Leontief inverse matrix Ψ, the cost-based Leontief inverse matrix Ψ˜, the vector of revenue-
based Domar weights or sales λ, the vector of cost-based Domar weights λ˜. As above, we
flag the Domar weights for factors by using uppercase variables, denoting the vector of
factor shares in income by Λ, and the vector of factor shares in costs by Λ˜.
In order to state our results, it will also be helpful to introduce the following covariance
operator:
CovΩ˜( j) ˜(Ψ(k),Ψ( f )) =
∑
i








where Ω˜( j) corresponds to the jth row of Ω˜, Ψ˜(k) to kth column of Ψ˜, and Ψ( f ) to the f th
column of Ψ. In words, this is the covariance between the kth column of Ψ˜ and the f th
column of Ψ using the jth row of Ω˜ as the distribution.31 Since the rows of Ω˜ always
sum to one for a reproducible (non-factor) industry j, we can formally think of this as a
covariance, and for a non-reproducible industry, the operator just returns 0.
3.2 Single Factor
We begin by investigating the impact of productivity and markup/wedge shocks on output
for the model with a single factor of production F = 1, which we index by L. We start with
productivity shocks, since the intuition gained from these will be useful in understanding
the impact of markup/wedges shocks as well.
3.2.1 Productivity Shocks
Proposition 3.1 (Productivity Shocks with One Factor). Suppose there is only one factor,






= λ˜k − d log ΛLd log Ak ,
31This covariance operator is similar to a variance operator defined by Acemoglu et al. (2016) in the















and Ψ(L) is the column of the Leontief inverse Ψ corresponding to L.
With variable misallocation, we keep the first term as before: namely, the effect of the
shock if the new resources were allocated passively, with the cost-based Domar weight
λ˜ correcting for the double-marginalization happening downstream from k. If the econ-
omy is acyclic or Cobb-Douglas, this is all we need. Otherwise, the allocation of labor
across different producers depends on the productivity levels. Hence, a productivity shock
can trigger reallocation of resources across producers, and thereby change the allocative
efficiency of the economy. This effect is captured by the change in cross-entropy, charac-
terized by equation (18). The result is a centrality measure which mixes networks and
elasticities of substitution.
We can think of ΨiL as the payments to labor as a share of the total revenue of producing
i — what Baqaee (2015) calls the network-adjusted labor share of i — and of ΛL as the share
of labor in the revenues of the economy. These quantities are related to the payments to
labor Ψ˜iL as a share of the total cost of producing i — taking into account the entire supply
chain — and to the share of labor Λ˜L in the costs of the economy. In an efficient economy
with one factor, we have ΨiL = Ψ˜iL = 1 and ΛL = Λ˜L = 1. By contrast, in an inefficient
economy we still have Ψ˜iL = 1, and Λ˜L = 1 but we no longer necessarily have ΨiL = 1 or
ΛL = 1. For example, if all markups are positive, we have ΨiL < 1 and ΛL < 1. A low value
of ΨiL indicates that on average, markups are high along the supply chain of industry i,
and a low value of ΛL indicates that on average, markups are high in the economy along
as a whole. The lower ΨiL/ΛL, the more distorted is the supply chain of industry i relative
to the economy as a whole. In other words, we can think of the Lth column of the Leontief
inverse Ψ(L) as measuring the degree of double-marginalization along the supply chain of
each industry. The economy’s labor content as a whole is given by labor’s share of income
ΛL. Industries with low values of Ψ(L)/ΛL have too few workers in their supply chain,
relative to the economy as a whole, due to the presence of markups.
With this interpretation, Proposition 3.1 becomes very intuitive. In response to a
positive productivity shock to industry k, the relative prices of all industries change
according to their exposure to k, measured by Ψ˜(k). If θ j > 1, the jth industry substitutes
across its inputs towards the industries with higher exposure Ψ˜(k) to k, since their relative
28
prices decline by more. If those industries also happen to have lower Ψ(L), then these
industries are inefficiently too small in the initial pre-shock equilibrium. In this case, there
is negative covariance between Ψ˜(k) and Ψ(L). This means that substitution, due to the
productivity shock, lowers overall misallocation, sending more workers to produce goods
which are inefficiently receiving too few workers. In this case, the changing allocation of
workers boosts the impact of the productivity shock on output. Of course, j is not the only
industry whose expenditure shares change and the same logic applies to all industries, so
we sum over all j. If the elasticities are less than one, or the covariance is negative, the
reallocation forces work against the positive impact of the technology shock.32
To further demonstrate the intuition of Proposition 3.1, we work through two examples:
the horizontal economy depicted in Figure 3, and the Cobb-Douglas economy.
HH
· · ·1 N
L
Figure 3: An “horizontal” economy where the solid arrows represent the flow of goods.
Note that this economy has a cycle.
Example 3.1 (Cobb-Douglas). A particular case of Proposition 3.1 is that of a Cobb-Douglas





This example takes a very simplified form because it does not feature changes in
allocative efficiency, because it coincides the with the passive rules for the allocation of
new resources. Next, we look at the simplest example which can feature such changes.
32Baqaee and Farhi (2017) show that for an economy like the one in Proposition 3.1, if the economy is
efficient, then the output response to a shock to industry k depends only on k’s role as a supplier. Proposition
3.1 shows that this fails if the equilibrium is inefficient. In particular, Ψ(L) — which captures information
about how distorted the supply chain of each industry is (i.e. it depends on the industry’s role as a consumer
of inputs), also matters, since it affects the response of misallocation.
29
Example 3.2 (Horizontal Economy). Consider the economy depicted in Figure 3. Let i



















As long as θ0 , 1, a productivity shock changes the fraction of workers employed
by each industry. If markups are heterogenous, then this reallocation of workers could
improve or worsen the amount of misallocation in this economy, thereby amplifying or
mitigating the effect of the shock. When θ0 > 1: the shock is amplified when k charges a
markup µk higher than the average markup µ−1k <
∑
i biµ−1i = ΛL. On the other hand, the
shock is attenuated if k charges a lower markup. These patterns are reversed if θ0 < 1.
All of this information is summarized by the change d H(Λ˜,Λ)/d log Ak in the cross-
entropy between the revenue and cost-based labor income shares, which in this simple
case is simply −d log ΛL/d log Ak. If in response to a productivity shock, the labor share
of income decreases, then this implies that allocative efficiency has improved because
industries that were too small because they were charging markups above the economy’s
average. The converse happens when the labor share of income increases in response to
the shock.34,35
Since misallocation is the reason for this complex behavior, a shock which does not
reallocate workers across industries is much simpler to analyze. For example, these forces
do not show up for a shock to labor (or equivalently, a TFP shock to industry L), since that
will simply scale up employment across all industries by the same amount:
d log C
d log L
= Λ˜L − d log ΛLd log L = Λ˜L = 1.
33Note that for this simple example, λi = λ˜i = bi for i ∈ {1, . . . ,N}.
34When θ0 > 1, the reduction in allocative efficiency can be so extreme that a positive productivity
shock can actually reduce output. A positive productivity shock can reduce TFP if k is significantly more





35This intuition only applies for productivity shocks — for a shock to markups, the change in the labor
share of income is no longer sufficient to diagnose the change in misallocation. We come back to this point
later when we examine markup shocks.
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3.2.2 Markup/Wedge Shocks
Next, we consider shocks to wedges rather than productivity. The intuition we gained
from the productivity shocks will prove useful here.
Proposition 3.2 (Makup/Wedge Shocks with One Factor). Suppose that there is only one
factor, denoted by L. Then
d log C
d logµk



















Proposition 3.2 implies that the effects of a positive markup shock are analogous to
the effects of a negative productivity shock. In response to a change in markup, there is a
direct effect −λ˜k on consumer prices from higher markups, and an indirect effect from the
changing factor income shares captured by −d log ΛL/d logµk.
Intuitively, the labor income share moves for two reasons. The first reason is exactly the
same as it would be for a negative productivity shock: every industry j substitutes across
its input branches in response to the change in the markups of k, and if this substitution
pattern covaries positively with the measure of supply chain distortions Ψ(L)/ΛL, then this
improves allocative efficiency. There is however a second set of upstream adjustment:
compared to a negative productivity shock to k an increase in the markup of k leads this
industry to release some resources to the rest of the economy. These released resources
can ultimately be expressed as released labor. The amount of labor released in proportion
to total labor λkΨkL/ΛL per unit of shock is given by k’s sales share λk times the labor
content of its revenue ΨkL divided by the economy’s labor income share ΛL.
We consider the same two examples as before: the Cobb-Douglas economy, and the
horizontal economy. The Cobb-Douglas example helps to isolate the importance of the
new term in Proposition 3.2. For a Cobb-Douglas economy, the only source factor real-
location comes from the fact that the industry which increases its markups releases some
labor. We also add an example illustrating how our results can be applied to compute the
gains from removing distortions, and we relate this popular measure of misallocation to
our notion of changes in allocative efficiency.
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Example 3.3 (Cobb Douglas). Let θ j = 1 for every j, which is the Cobb-Douglas special
case. Now, applying Proposition 3.2, we get
d log C
d logµk










As before, ΨkL/ΛL is a measure of how distorted the supply chain of k is relative to the
economy as a whole. If ΨkL/ΛL < 1, then this means that for each dollar k earns, a
smaller share reaches workers than it would if that dollar was spent by the household.
In other words, industry k’s supply chain has inefficiently too few workers. On the other
hand, λk/λ˜k is a measure of how distorted the demand of chain of k is. If λk/λ˜k < 1, this
implies that k is facing double-marginalization. When the product of the downstream and
upstream terms is less than one, this means industry k is inefficiently starved of demand
and workers. Hence, an increase in the markups of k reduces the allocative efficiency of
the economy. On the other hand, when the product of these two terms is greater than
one, the path connecting the household to labor via industry k is too large. Therefore, an
increase in the markups of k reallocates resources to the rest of the economy where they
are more needed and increaes allocative efficiency.
We also revisit the horizontal economy of Figure 3, but this time, instead of productivity
shocks, we examine the effect of markup shocks. Furthermore, we now allow for the
possibility that the economy does not have a Cobb-Douglas structure.
Example 3.4 (Horizontal Economy). Consider the horizontal economy example, but now
suppose that markups are shocked instead. By Proposition 3.2 we know that this is just
the negative of the effect for the productivity shock plus a correction for the fact that the
markup shock releases some labor, in proportion to the share of workers it employs, to
the rest of the economy:
d log C
d logµk












The first two terms are just the negative of what we had for a productivity shock and the
final term adjusts for the difference between productivity and markup shocks. Since this




















Unlike the case with productivity shocks, where Cobb-Douglas was the case with
constant misallocation where workers would not be reallocated in response to productivity
shocks, here θ0 = 0, or Leontief production, is the case where misallocation is constant.
This is due to the fact that with perfect complementarity, the minimum amount of goods
needed to consume 1 unit aggregate consumption does not depend on the markups.
Hence, in this case, changes in the markup have no effect on the extent of misallocation.
However, if θ0 , 0, then labor is reallocated across producers in response to the shock.
In particular, labor is reallocated from k to the other industries. Hence, depending on
whether k is inefficiently too small or too large, the shock can have a positive or negative
impact. The higher is θ0, the larger the magnitude of this impact since reallocation is
monotonically increasing in the elasticity of substitution in this case.36,37
Finally, we consider an example illustrating how our results can be applied to compute
the gains from removing distortions, and we relate this popular measure of misallocation
to our notion of changes in allocative efficiency.
Example 3.5 (Measuring Allocative Efficiency). Changes in allocative efficiency are marginal
in nature: we define them as the gap that opens up between the competitive allocation
and the passive allocation in response to shocks, assuming both start at the same initial
allocation. In this sense, allocative efficiency can be interpreted locally as a counterfactual
conditional. Our measure is especially convenient because it can be measured directly
without any knowledge about the production functions over and above expenditure data.
There are other measures of allocative efficiency in the literature. For example, Restuc-
cia and Rogerson (2008), Hsieh and Klenow (2009), and many others adopt the following
measure: by how much would output increase if all wedges were eliminated. The larger
36As discussed earlier, relabelling allows us to turn markup shocks into shocks to tax wedges and vice
versa. For example, consider the horizontal economy with N homogenous industries who produce using
labor as their only input, and sell to the household. These industries are perfectly competitive, but their
labor inputs are subject to an industry specific tax τi for each industry i. The revenues generated from these
taxes is rebated lump sum to the household. From our results above, we can write
d log C








Once again, in this second best world, a reduction in a wedge can decrease output and welfare by worsening
misallocation.
37This result relates to Epifani and Gancia (2011), who show that in a horizontal economy, output losses
from markup dispersion are monotonically increasing in the elasticity of substitution (when compared to
social planner’s allocation).
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the number, the more misallocated the economy. And then one can try to look at changes
in misallocation as changes in this measure over time.
This measure captures the change in the distance from the unobserved efficient frontier
of the economy. Our notion of changes in allocative efficiency is an entirely different
concept: it measures the contribution to TFP along the equilibrium path, rather than
the change in the distance of the economy from the efficient production frontier. The
former concept relies on a tightly parameterized model, with full information about the
underlying production functions, as this is the only way of placing the unobserved global
efficient production frontier. Our concept, by contrast, is local, and can be measured
without strong parametric assumptions.
To see how these two could move in opposite directions, consider a horizontal economy
with two producers and σ > 1. Suppose A1/µ1 = A2/µ2, with A1 > A2. Then, at steady-
state, the two firms split demand and workers evenly. Now, if the first firm receives a
positive productivity shock, workers are reallocated from 2 to 1, and allocative efficiency
improves. However, locally, this can increase dispersion in 1/µi, and thereby increase the
gains from eliminating the markups. In general, the relationship between our measure of
changes in allocative efficiency and changes in the gains from eliminating distortions do
not need to move together. Of course, our ex-ante results can be used to allow us to think
about the gains from reducing wedges.
As an example, consider the horizontal economy in Figure 3. Using formula (22),
we deduce the first-order impact on output from shrinking all relative markups towards
1, by considering a transformation of each markup µˆi = tµi + (1 − t). When t = 1, this
transformation leaves markups as they are. On the other hand, t = 0 eliminates all


















The variance of a random variable divided by its mean is called the index of dispersion.
Hence, the gain to output from shrinking all markups depends positively on the elasticity
of substitution θ0 and the expenditure-share weighted index of dispersion in 1/µi. Using
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the dispersion of wedges to measure misallocation is common in the literature and this
example shows how our formulas, in simple cases, will deliver such results.
3.3 Multiple Factors
So far, we have restricted ourselves to the case of a single factor of production (and
therefore constant returns to scale). In this subsection, we extend our results to cover the
case with multiple factors of production (or decreasing returns to scale). We index all
factors by f , but we also sometimes use L as a generic index for a factor. We denote by Λ f
be the aggregate income share of factor f .
3.3.1 Productivity Shocks
Proposition 3.3 (Productivity Shocks with Multiple Factors). In response to a productivity
shock, the following linear system describes the change in factor income shares:















Given d log Λ f/d log Ak, we know, from Theorem 2.2 that
d log C
d log Ak




d log Λ f
d log Ak
.
Proposition 3.1 can be seen immediately as a special case of Proposition 3.3. When
there is only one factor,
∑
f Ψ˜( f ) d log Λ f/d log Ak is a constant vector and drops out of the
covariance term, which allows us to recover the result for the case with a single factor.
As a bonus, this Proposition 3.3 also determines how factor income shares for different
factors move in response to productivity shocks in a distorted economy. This is a question
of independent interest for analyses of inequality and growth. We can rewrite equation
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∑
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When there is only factor, Γ = 0, and we are left with only δ(k), which is just equation
(21). To see intuition for equation (24), imagine a negative shock d log Ak < 0 to industry
k. For fixed factor prices, every industry i will substitute across its inputs in response to
this shock. Suppose that θi < 1, so that industry i substitutes towards those inputs that
are more reliant on industry k, captured by Ψ˜ik. Now, if those inputs are also more reliant
on factor f , captured by a high CovΩ(i)
(
Ψ˜(k),Ψ( f )/Λ f
)
, then substitution by i will increase
demand for factor f .
If the economy has only a single factor denoted by L, then we simply need to consider




weighted by the size λi and markups µ−1i of i for all
i, and this is precisely what δ(k) does.
However, when there are multiple factors, the change in demand for factors will affect
relative factor prices, and the change in relative factor prices will set off additional rounds
of substitution in the economy that we must account for, and this is the role Γ plays.
Crucially, the matrix Γ does not depend on which industry k has been shocked, since it
encodes how changes in factor income shares affect factor income shares.
Indeed, for a given set of factor prices, the shock to k affects demand for each factor,
and hence the factor income shares, and this is measured by the F × 1 vector δ(k). This
change in the factor income shares then causes further substitution through the network,
leading to additional changes in factor demands and prices. The impact of the change in
the relative price of factor f ′ on the demand for factor f is measured by the f f ′th element
of the F × F matrix Γ. The movements in factor shares are the fixed point of this process,
i.e. the solution of equation (24).
Proposition 3.3 is tightly connected with the results in Baqaee and Farhi (2017), which
characterize the change in sales shares (for goods and factors) in a general efficient mul-
tisector economy. However, whereas for an efficient economy, changes in factor income
shares determine the second-order impact of shocks on output, for a distorted economy,
this information is required even for the first-order impact of shocks.







Figure 4: An economy with two factors of production L and K. The subgraph from L to the
household contains a cycle, and hence can be subject to misallocation. On the other hand,
there is only a unique path connecting K to the household, so there is no misallocation.
Example 3.6 (Horizontal Economy with Multiple Factors). We have
Γ = (1 − θ0)
 Covb(Ψ˜(L),Ψ(L)) Covb(Ψ˜(K),Ψ(L))Covb(Ψ˜(L),Ψ(K)) Covb(Ψ˜(K),Ψ(K))
 , (25)
and
δ(i) = (θ0 − 1)
 Covb(Ψ˜(i),Ψ(L))Covb(Ψ˜(i),Ψ(K))
 .
Substituting in the values and solving the system of equations (24), using Proposition 3.3,
and noting that λi = λ˜i for all i, we find that
d log C
d log Ai











= λi, (i = 3).
The details for this example are in Appendix B.38 A lesson is that changes in allocative
efficiency are only present for shocks to industries 1 and 2 which share a factor of produc-
tion, but not for industry 3 which has its own factor of production. Moreover, the changes
in allocative efficiency for shocks to industries 1 and 2 only depends on the markups in
38For this example bi = λi = λ˜i for i = 1, 2, 3.
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these two industries and not on the markup in industry 3.
We can also use Proposition 3.4 to analyze models with decreasing-returns-to-scale (or
equivalently, limited factor reallocation).
Example 3.7 (Decreasing-returns-to-scale/limited reallocation). Suppose there are N goods,
each good i is produced using a specific factor fi and a generic non-specific factor L with
a Cobb-Douglas production function. The weight of specific factor is α for every i. This
could capture limited factor reallocation, but it is also equivalent to letting each industry
have decreasing returns to scale. The household has uniform preferences over all the final







(1 − α)2(1 − θ0) + ΛLµkθ0
ΛLµk(1 − α + αθ0)
)
,
where ΛL = (1 − α)/N ∑i µ−1i . When α = 1, the economy is acyclic, there are no changes
in allocative efficiency and d log C/d log Ak = 1/N. But when α = 0, we recover the
horizontal economy with only one factor of production, which in general features changes
in allocative efficiency so that d log C/d log Ak , 1/N. Intermediate values of α interpolate
between these two extremes.
Our last example is Cobb-Douglas, which, as per our earlier discussion, features
constant misallocation even with multiple factors




We end this section but showing how our results can be extended to cover the impact
of shocks to markups/wedges, in a manner similar to Proposition 3.2. The intuition for this
result is the same as it was in the single factor case: a markup shock has the same effect as
a negative productivity shock, with the additional fact that we must account for the fact
that compared to a negative productivity shock, a markup shock leads the corresponding
industry to release some resources to the rest of the economy. These released resources
can eventually be translated into released factor uses.
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3.3.2 Markup Shocks
Proposition 3.4 (Markup/Wedge Shocks with Multiple Factors). In response to a markup
shock, the following linear system describes the change in factor income shares:














 − λk Ψk fΛ f . (27)
Given d log Λ f/d logµk, we know, from Theorem 2.3 that
d log C
d logµk




d log Λ f
d logµk
.
To isolate the importance of this new term, we go back to the the Cobb-Douglas
economy with a markup shock, where the only source factor reallocation comes from the
fact that the industry which increases its markups releases some factors.
Example 3.9 (Cobb Douglas). Let θ j = 1 for every j, which is the Cobb-Douglas special
case. Now, applying Proposition 3.2, we get
d log C
d logµk














This generalizes the intuitions discussed earlier for markup/wedge shocks in the Cobb-
Douglas economy with a single factor to the case of multiple factors. In particular, the
amount of factor f released by sector k as a fraction of total factor f per unit of shock is
λkΨk f/Λ f and the impact of that release on output per unit of shock is Λ˜ f . We also see
again the roles of the index of downstream distortions λk/λ˜k and of the generalized index
of upstream distortions
∑
f Λ˜ f Ψk f/Λ f .
3.4 Endogenous Productivities and Markups/Wedges
Our results can be used in contexts where markups/wedges or productivities are endoge-
nous in order to characterize the effects of some more primitive fundamental shocks.
Imagine that some additional structure imposed on the model gives rise to endogenous
productivities and markups. Consider some more fundamental disturbance θ. For any
such structure, the vector of equilibrium productivities and markups µ can be expressed
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as a vector functions A(θ) and µ(θ) of the vector θ.
These functions are not primitives of the model. Instead they are equilibrium objects
the determination of which could be complex and interesting in and of itself. This is
however not the focus of our paper. What our results can be used for is to understand the
consequences of these endogenous movements in markups and productivities. Indeed,








− Λ˜′d log Λ
d log A
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where ◦ denotes the element-by-element (Hadamard) product of two matrices, and where
the expressions d log Λ/d log A and d log Λ/d logµ are given as a function of the structural
microeconomic parameters of the model by Propositions 3.3 and 3.4.
We provide a fully worked out example along these lines in Section 4.3 when we
consider a model with nominal rigidities. The model can be recast as a model with en-
dogenous markups ensuring that the relevant prices stay constant. In this case, we actually
explicitly solve these endogenous markups as a function of the underlying productivity
and monetary policy shocks. We then apply the chain rule in conjunction with our results
exactly as in equation (28) to characterize the effects of these shocks.
4 Applications
In this section, we pursue some quantitative applications of our results. First, we use
our reduced-form results to measure changes in allocative efficiency in the US over time,
and to decompose the Solow-residual into changes in pure-technology and changes in
allocative efficiency. Next, we we calibrate a simplified version of our parametric model
to match firm-level markup and size data, as well as input-output data. We compute
output elasticities with respect to firm-level and industry-level shocks to productivity and
markups, and we compare these elasticities to those implied by the perfectly competitive
and Cobb-Douglas models. We also use these elasticities to approximate aggregate volatil-
ity. Finally, we end the section by showing how our results can be used to study models
with nominal rigidities that have inefficient steady-states and input-output networks. All
of our results emphasize that reallocation forces that we emphasize play a quantitatively
significant role in determining aggregate output and TFP.
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We work with the annual US input-output data from the BEA, dropping the govern-
ment, noncomparable imports, and second-hand scrap industries. The dataset contains
industrial output and inputs from 1997 to 2015 with 66 industries. We calibrate the ex-
penditure share parameters to match the input-output table, and we use three alternative
measures of markups estimated for Compustat firms. We only have markups and sales
data at the microeconomic level for publicly listed firms in the US from Compustat. To
extrapolate to the whole economy, we therefore make the assumption that Compustat
firms are representative of the overall economy in the sense that the sales-weighted dis-
tributions of markups by industry and their transition matrices for the overall economy
are the same as for Compustat. We then combine these data with input-output data at the
industry level from the BEA to aggregate the economy.
The first markup series is estimated by Gutie´rrez and Philippon (2016) and Gutierrez
(2017), and relies on inferring markups from measured profits. These estimates are de-
rived as residuals from gross operating surplus, after accounting for “normal” payments
to capital. The “normal” payments to capital are computed via a user-cost of capital
calculation, where the rental price takes into account the equity risk premium, following
the framework of Caballero et al. (2017). We refer to these markups as GP markups. The
second method for computing markups is to use the Lerner index, referred to as LI, which
infers markups from average operating profit margin. The final set of estimates are from
De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017), which we call DE markups, and rely on the production
function estimation method laid out in De Loecker and Warzynski (2012). DE markups
are given by the ratio of the elasticity of the production function to a variable input to the
share of that input in revenues. All markup series are estimated for publicly listed firms
in the US from Compustat.
The three markup series give different levels of markups: the GP markups are the
smallest (and average around 5%), the LI markups are higher (averaging around 13%), and
the DE markups are the largest (averaging around 30%). Whereas the GP and LI markups
capture “average” markup margins (by stripping out expenses from revenues), the DE
markups are designed to capture markups at the margin (gaps between the expenditure
shares and output elasticities). For our empirical application, we maintain the assumption
of constant returns, so there is no theoretical reason to prefer one set of markups over
another.
Each markup series comes with its own pros and cons. The GP markups require
measurements of the capital stock and industry-level estimates of the equity risk premium,
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both of which are notoriously difficult to measure. The DE markups on the other hand,
rely on more parametric methods, and their changes over time are potentially biased in the
presence of capital-biased technical change. We use the GP markups for our benchmark
numbers, and we report numbers for the other two markup series in the tables and
in Appendix A.39 Despite their differences, all three markup series show an increasing
average markup over the sample.
4.1 Decomposing the Solow Residual
In this section, we implement our reduced-form results to decompose the sources of TFP
growth as measured by the cumulated Solow residual in the US over the period 1997-2015,
in the presence of these changing markups.
Conditional on markups and the input-output matrix at a given point in time t, we can
approximate ∆H(Λ˜t−1,Λt−1) = −Λ˜′t−1∆ log Λt−1 from t− 1 to t using the change in observed
factor income shares. Then we can decompose the Solow residual using equation (8).
The results are plotted in Figure 5 using the GP markups. The sum of the red (allocative
efficiency), yellow (factor under-counting), and purple (“pure” technology) lines add up
to give the cumulative change in the Solow residual. Since we are interested in long-run
trends, we assume that the only factors are labor and capital, and we abstract away from
barriers to reallocation of factors like adjustment costs and variable capacity utilization.
We see that since the start of the sample, allocative efficiency has improved, and
accounts for about 50% of TFP growth as measured by the cumulated Solow residual. The
correction for the under-counting of factors in the Solow residual arising from the fact
that Λt−1 , Λ˜t−1 is negative but small. Taken together, this implies that “pure” technology
changes, which are computed as a residual, also account for about 50% of TFP growth as
measured by the cumulated Solow residual. In other words, because allocative efficiency
has improved considerably, “pure” technology has improved much less than would be
implied by a naive interpretation of the Solow residual.
As documented by Gutierrez (2017), average markups have been increasing in all three
of our markup series. Given the increase in the average markup, and the growing profit
share in the economy, how then can we claim that allocative efficiency has increased over
the same period? The key lies in realizing that markups on average have increased pri-
39Note that our method allows for capital-biased technical change. In particular, we can measure changes
in allocative efficiency independently of the nature of productivity shocks (Hicks neutral or factor biased).
For more details see the discussion in Section 2.8.
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marily because firms that charge large markups have gotten larger. While on average,
markups are trending upwards, the average change in log markups has not been increas-
ing. If on average, markups are not increasing, but firms with high markups are getting
larger, then this implies that allocative efficiency in the economy must be increasing. Of
course, to quantify and weigh the various changes correctly, we need to use the weights
in equation (8).
In Figure 6 we plot the cumulative sum of −λ˜′t−1∆ logµt and ∆H(Λ˜t−1,Λt−1) over the
sample. Note that these are two components of changes in allocative efficiency. Both terms
have contributed positively to allocative efficiency. The fact that the first term is positive
means that (the appropriately weighted) average change in markups has been negative,
even though the average markup has been increasing. The fact that the second term is
positive means that there has been a reduction in the factor income shares, reflecting the
fact that the average markup has been increasing. These two terms confirm the composi-
tional origin of the increase in the average markup with high-markup firms expanding at
the expense of low-markup firms, and the resulting improvement in allocative efficiency.
Overall, these patterns are also borne out when we use the LI and DE markups,
although the magnitudes are different (see Appendix A). In particular, the contribution
of allocative efficiency is similar at roughly 50% of the cumulated Solow residual, but the
correction for factor under-counting is larger, simply because the markups are larger. As
a result, the contribution of “pure” technology is also larger and is about equivalent to the
cumulated growth of the Solow residual.
4.2 A Quantitative Structural Model
In this section, we use our structural results to explore quantitatively the importance of
markup distortions. We calibrate a simplified version of the parametric model in Section
3.1.
To calibrate the model, we need estimates for industry-specific firm-level and industry-
level structural elasticities of substitution. Unfortunately, disaggregated estimates of these
elasticities do not exist. We consider a nested CES structure where each firm i in industry


































Figure 5: The decomposition in equation (8) using the Gutie´rrez and Philippon (2016)
markup data.











Figure 6: The cumulated contribution of (minus) changes in log markups −λ˜′t−1∆ logµt
and of changes in cross entropy ∆H(Λ˜t−1,Λt−1) using the Gutie´rrez and Philippon (2016)
markup data. The sum of the two components give the overall cumulated change in
allocative efficiency.
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Following our previous work (Baqaee and Farhi, 2017), and drawing on estimates from
Atalay (2017) and Boehm et al. (2014), we set θ = 0.3, θ0 = 0.4, and ε ≈ 0. We set ηi = 1
which is a focal point in the literature about the micro-elasticity of substitution between
labor and capital 40 Finally, we set ξ = 8, which is within the range of estimates of the
variety-level elasticity of substitution from the industrial organization and international
trade literatures. An elasticity of ξ = 8 is also consistent with our measure of average
markups in the benchmark model, assuming a Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) market structure.
Gains from Reducing Markups
We first use the model to calculate the gain to aggregate TFP from eliminating markups.To
do this, consider changing markups µi,k for producer i in industry k to be tµi,k + (1 − t)
where µi,k is the original markup. This transformation shifts all markups towards unity by
t percentage points. Table 1 reports the elasticity of the TFP gains to the markup reduction.
Using the benchmark GP markups, the implied aggregate TFP gains from a 1% reduction
in markups are about 0.73% points.
To extrapolate the aggregate TFP gains from eliminating markups, we use a second-
order approximation. We have just computed the elasticity of aggregate TFP gains to a
40There is quite a bit of disagreement in that literature, most estimates cluster a bit below 1, but there are
also some estimates slightly above 1.
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reduction in markups at the observed inefficient allocation. We also know from Theorem
2.1 that at the efficient equilibrium, the elasticity of aggregate TFP to a reduction in
markups is zero. Hence, using the insights of Hotelling (1938) and Theil (1967), we
can construct a second-order estimate of the gains from reducing markups by averaging
the first order gains at the initial and terminal (efficient) allocation. This means that to
a second order, the gains from eliminating markups are given by e0.73/2+0/2 − 1 ≈ 44% of
aggregate TFP. This corresponds to the equivalent of the area of the Harberger deadweight
loss triangle in our general equilibrium model, which can also be interpreted as a second-
order approximation, as shown by Hotelling (1938).
The LI markups imply somewhat smaller gains, and the DE markups imply the largest
gains. Indeed, with LI markups, the aggregate TFP gains from a 1% reduction in markups
is 0.65%, and the gains from eliminating markups is 38%. With DE markups, these
numbers are 0.79% and 48%.
Interestingly, we find that the gains from reducing markups have increased substan-
tially since the start of the sample for all three series. For example, using our benchmark
GP markups, we find that the gains from eliminating markups are e0.09/2+0/2 − 1 ≈ 4.5%
in 1997, much smaller that the corresponding number of 44% in 2014. As we described
in example 3.5 in Section 3.1, this finding is logically consistent with our finding that
allocative efficiency has improved since the start of the sample, since the counterfactual
comparison in the two scenarios is conceptually different. Our concept of change in alloca-
tive efficiency measures contributions of changes in allocative efficiency to aggregate TFP
along the equilibrium path, whereas changes in gains from eliminating markups measure
changes in the distance from the unobserved efficient frontier of the economy.
In Table 2, we repeat the markup reduction exercise for some alternative specifica-
tions of the structural model. We consider the gains implied by a Cobb-Douglas-CES
specification of the model which imposes that all elasticities apart from the elasticities of
substitutions among firms within an industry are equal to 1, as well as the gains for a
Cobb-Douglas-Cobb-Douglas specification of the model which imposes that all elasticities
are equal to 1. We also compute the gains that would be implied by using value-added
production functions which ignore the role of the production network. Value-added pro-
duction functions are commonly used in the literature on misallocation, and our results
suggest that relying on this simplification can substantively reduce the gains from elim-
inating frictions. In particular, we find that working with value-added productions can
cut the estimated gains from reducing markups by half.
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Gutie´rrez-Philippon Lerner Index De Loecker-Eeckhout
2014 0.73 0.65 0.79
1997 0.09 0.16 0.55





((d log C/d logµi(µi − 1)./µi)))(0.99 − 1)) − 1 for the various markup series for
the beginning and end of our sample.
Benchmark CD+CES CD+CD VA Benchmark VA CD + CES VA CD + CD
GP 0.73% 0.76% 0.47% 0.31% 0.30% 0.19%
LI 0.65% 0.67 % 0.43 % 0.31% 0.30% 0.19%
DE 0.79% 0.84% 0.27% 0.40 % 0.41 % 0.13%
Table 2: Gains in aggregate TFP from shrinking all markups towards 1 by 1% for different
markup series, and different structural models. CD+CES preserves the input-output
structure, but sets all elasticities except ξ equal to one. CD + CD sets all elasticities to
one. VA specifications eliminate the input-output matrix and use value-added production
functions, a la Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) and Hsieh and Klenow (2009). For VA, all
elasticities except ξ equal to one, VA CES uses the same elasticities as the benchmark
model, and VA CD sets all elasticities of substitution equal to one.
Our estimate that eliminating markups in the US economy in 2014 would increase
TFP by about 40% raises the estimated cost of monopoly distortions by two orders of
magnitude compared to the famous estimates of 0.1% of Harberger (1954). Essentially, the
reasons for this dramatic difference is that we use firm-level data, whereas Harberger only
had access to sectoral data, and that the dispersion of markups is higher across firms within
a sector than across sectors. Moreover, the relevant elasticity of substitution is higher in
our exercise than in Harberger’s since it applies across firms within a sector rather than
across sectors. Finally, we properly take into account the input-output structure of the
economy to aggregate the numbers in all industries whereas Harberger only focused on
manufacturing. Of course, both our estimate and Harberger’s are static, taking as given
the level of productivity in the economy. Of course, markups may be playing an important
role in incentivizing innovation and entry, so that exogenously eliminating markups may
harm productivity. In Section 5, we discuss how one might try to account for these forces.
Briefly, even if markups do play an important role in incentivizing innovation, they also
distort the allocation of resources and our calculation is aimed at quantifying this latter
effect.
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Volatility of Aggregate TFP
We perform comparative statics in both productivity and markup shocks at both the firm
and industry level.41











Assuming productivity shocks and markup shocks are independent and identically dis-
















= ‖Dlog A log C‖2Var(d log A) + ‖Dlogµ log C‖2Var(d logµ).
Hence, the Euclidean norm ‖Dlog A log C‖ of the Jacobian of log C with respect to log A
gives the degree to which microeconomic productivity shocks are not “diverisified” away
in the aggregate. Similarly, ‖Dlogµ log C‖ measures the diversification factor relative to
markup shocks.42
Table 3 displays the diversification factor, for both markup shocks and productivity
shocks at the firm level and at the industry level, for our benchmark model. We also com-
pute the results for a Cobb-Douglas distorted economy where all elasticities are unitary, as
well as for a perfectly competitive model without wedges. Across the board, the distorted
model is more volatile than the competitive model, however the extent of this depends
greatly on the type of shock and the level of aggregation. We discuss these different cases
in turn.
First, consider the case of productivity shocks: as mentioned previously, the benchmark
model is more volatile than the competitive model for both sets of shocks. However, the
more interesting comparison is with respect to the distorted Cobb-Douglas economy. As
explained in Section 2.5, the allocation of factors is invariant to productivity shocks in the
Cobb-Douglas model. Hence, the Cobb-Douglas model lacks the reallocation channel,
41When we consider firm-level shocks, we assess only the contribution of shocks to Compustat firms.
We focus on this exercise, for which we have the necessary data, because we do not have the data required
to compute the contribution of shocks to all firms.
42Although Baqaee and Farhi (2017) suggest that log-linear approximations can be unreliable for model-
ing the mean, skewness, or kurtosis of output in the presence of microeconomic shocks, their results indicate
the log-linear approximations of variance are less fragile (although still imperfect). In the final section of
this paper, we discuss how our results can be extended to understanding the nonlinear impact of shocks.
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Benchmark Competitive Cobb-Douglas Passive
Firm Productivity Shocks (GP) 0.0476 0.0376 0.0396 0.0396
Firm Markup Shocks (GP) 0.0451 0.0000 0.0345 0.0000
Industry Productivity Shocks (GP) 0.3162 0.3109 0.3261 0.3261
Industry Markup Shocks (GP) 0.0279 0.0000 0.0297 0.0000
Firm Productivity Shocks (LI) 0.0502 0.0372 0.0415 0.0415
Firm Markup Shocks (LI) 0.0602 0.0000 0.0413 0.0000
Industry Productivity Shocks (LI) 0.3188 0.3079 0.3377 0.3377
Industry Markup Shocks (LI) 0.0356 0.0000 0.0382 0.0000
Firm Productivity Shocks (DE) 0.0621 0.0346 0.0398 0.0398
Firm Markup Shocks (DE) 0.0663 0.0000 0.0295 0.0000
Industry Productivity Shocks (DE) 0.3299 0.3133 0.3618 0.3618
Industry Markup Shocks (DE) 0.0648 0.0000 0.1166 0.0000
Table 3: Diversification factor for different productivity and markup shocks at firm and
industry level for different specifications of the model. A diversification factor of 1 means
that the variance of microeconomic shocks moves aggregate variance one-for-one. A
diversification factor of 0 means that microeconomic shocks are completely diversified
away at the aggregate level. GP corresponds to the Gutie´rrez and Philippon (2016)
markups, LI is markups according to the Lerner Index, and DE is using markup data from
De Loecker and Eeckhout (2017).
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and hence can tell us in which direction the reallocation force is pushing. In the case of
industry-level shocks, the benchmark model is slightly less volatile than the Cobb-Douglas
model, whereas in the case of firm-level shocks, the benchmark model is significantly more
volatile.
A partial intuition here relates to the elasticities of substitution: whereas industries are
complements, firms within an industry are strong substitutes. Recall that loosely speaking,
changes in allocative efficiency scale with the elasticity of substitution minus one. Firm-
level shocks cause a considerable amount of changes in allocative efficiency whereas
industry-level shocks cause much milder changes. At both levels of aggregation, these
changes in allocative efficiency amplify some shocks and mitigate some others compared
to the Cobb-Douglas model with no change in allocative effiency.43 On the whole, at the
firm level, the changes in allocative efficiency are so large that they dwarf the “pure”
technology effects picked up by the Cobb-Douglas model and amplify the volatility of
these shocks. By contrast, at the industry level, changes in allocative efficiency are more
moderate and turn out to slightly mitigate the volatility of these shocks.
This intuition is confirmed in the first two rows in Figure 7, where we plot the output
elasticity with respect to productivity shocks to specific firms or industries relative to their
cost-based Domar weight (i.e. relative to the Cobb-Douglas model) and to their revenue-
based Domar weight (i.e. relative to the competitive model). We find considerable
dispersion in the response of the model relative to both, but much more so at the firm
level than at the industry level.
Next, consider the effects of markup shocks. In this case, the distorted Cobb-Douglas
economy is not necessarily a very natural benchmark since even with Cobb-Douglas,
shocks to markups will reallocate factors across producers. Nonetheless, it is still instruc-
tive to compare the benchmark model to the Cobb-Douglas one to find that a similar
lesson applies as with productivity shocks. The volatility of firm-level shocks is amplified
relative to Cobb-Douglas while the volatility of industry-level shocks is attenuated rela-
tive to Cobb-Douglas. This follows from the fact that industries are more complementary
than firms, and hence, in line with the intuition from example 3.9, the effect of the shock
are monotonically increasing in the degree of substitutability.
The last two rows of Figure 7 plot the output elasticity with respect to markup shocks
to specific firms or industries relative to their cost-based Domar weight or revenue-based
43There is another difference: reallocation occurs towards the firm receiving a positive shock; but reallo-
cation occurs away from the industry receiving a positive shock
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Domar weight. In the case of markup shocks and in contrast to productivity shocks, these
ratios can no longer be interpreted as comparisons with counterfactuals, and instead
should be taken as sensible normalizations of the way to report the results.
4.3 Nominal Rigidities
Finally, we apply our general framework to study the effects of sticky prices in economies
with arbitrary production structures.44 In general, sticky prices can be modeled via
variable markups: markups which move to ensure that the relevant nominal prices stay
constant. This is the point of connection with our framework. We show how to solve for
these endogenous markups, and then to trace their impact on the economy.
In this section, we have two goals: first, we show how the existence of nominal rigidities
changes the mapping from microeconomic productivity shocks to aggregate output or TFP
in economies with distorted steady states; second, we show how monetary policy shocks
can be analyzed using our results in economies with distorted steady states, leading to a
clean separation the oft-neglected effects of monetary policy shocks on allocative efficiency
from their traditional aggregate demand effects. In these applications, the steady-state
distortions are the estimated markups discussed above in a given year. The endogenous
response of markups to shocks is solved for to ensure that the relevant prices remain fixed.
These exercises are useful demonstrations of how to apply our results more generally
in cases where markups are endogenous or variable. They also draw attention to the
fact that the typical loglinearization of New Keynesian models around undistorted steady
states is potentially misleading.
To model money demand we use the simplest formulation and assume that there is a
cash in advance constraint
PcC = M,
where M is the instrument of monetary policy.
We index each individual producer by i, and write a firm-level input-output matrix in
standard form. To model sticky prices, let s denote the set of producers with fixed prices,
and let es be the N× |s|matrix given by es = [ei]{i∈s}, where ei is the ith standard basis vector.
Using the firm-level formulation, we can solve for the change in markups d logµ that
would keep the price of sticky-firms constant, in response to the vector of productivity
44Starting with Basu (1995), a literature has grown to emphasize the importance of intermediate goods
for understanding the business cycle properties of models with sticky prices. See for example Bouakez et al.
(2009), Nakamura and Steinsson (2010), Pasten et al. (2016, 2017).
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Figure 7: The top two rows are histograms of d log C/d log A relative to λ and λ˜ for firm-
level and industry-level shocks respectively. The bottom two rows are d log C/d logµ
relative to λ and λ˜ for firm-level and industry-level shocks respectively. The bunching at
the extremes marked with a star arise from a truncation performed solely for displaying
purposes. In all cases, the degree of dispersion around the response implied by the
competitive model or the size of the producer is substantial. Distributions have been
truncated at 4 standard deviations.
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shocks d log A the vector of changes in factor prices d log w:
d logµ = (e′sΨ˜es)
−1e′sΨ˜(d log A − α˜d log w). (29)
To solve for how the change in factor prices, we use
d log w = d log Λ + d log M − d log L.
Combining these two equations characterizes how output responds to productivity or
money shocks in general equilibrium
d log C − Λ˜′ d log L = λ˜′ d log A − λ˜′es d logµ + d H(Λ˜,Λ), (30)
where d logµ is now determined according to (29).45
To finish our characterization, we need to make an assumption about labor supply,
since equation (30) takes the change in factor supply as given. To fix ideas, we follow con-
vention in the New Keynesian literature, and assume labor is the only factor of production
and that the household utility function takes the form:




where ν is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply. Under these conditions, we can combine
equations (30), (14), and (15) to explicitly solve out the labor supply decision.
Proposition 4.1 (Nominal Rigidities). Suppose that labor is the only factor of production. Then




Λ˜ d log Λ,
with
d logµ = (e′sΨ˜es)
−1e′sΨ˜(d log A − α˜
(







45See Proposition B.1 in the Appendix for a formal statement and proof of these results.
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where Λ is the labor share of income. If the economy has a nested CES form, then















Equation (30) gives the change in aggregate TFP in response to either monetary or tech-
nology shocks in a New Keynesian type environment and decomposes it into a “pure”
change in technology component and change in allocative efficiency component. Propo-
sition 4.1 characterizes the corresponding changes in output.
Typically, New Keynesian models are log-linearized around the efficient steady state,
and in those cases, the changes in allocative efficiency are second-order and are therefore
neglected.46 In these cases, our results deliver the same conclusion.47 Outside of these
special cases, for inefficient steady states, changes in allocative efficiency are not zero, and
our results then permit us to isolate these effects.
In their important study, Pasten et al. (2016) characterize the response of output to
shocks in a model with Calvo frictions and production networks. They write the input-
output matrix at the industry level, and suppose that some fraction δi of firms in industry
i have flexible prices. Their sharpest analytical result is for the case with log utility in
consumption and an infinite Frisch elasticity of labor supply. In this special case, the
response of output to shocks takes a very simple form — sticky prices act like shock
absorbers to productivity shocks. Using Proposition 4.1, we can recover their result and
shed light on why this happens.
Proposition 4.2. [Pasten et al. 2016] Suppose that utility is log in consumption and the Frisch
elasticity of labor supply is infinite. Then Proposition 4.1 implies




d log A + λ˜′es(e′sΨ˜es)
−1e′s1 d log M.
46See, for example, Galı´ (2008).
47The case of the efficient steady-state is immediate in Proposition 4.1, since at the efficient steady-state
Ψ(L) is a vector of all ones, and the covariances are all zero. Hence, at the efficient steady state, Proposition
4.1 implies that the change in allocative efficiency, to a first order, is
−λ˜′ d logµ − Λ˜ d log Λ = −
N∑
k=1





d logµk = −
N∑
k=1
λk d logµk +
∑
k
λk d logµk = 0.
Of course, for a monopolistic economy, if the production network is irregular (or asymmetric), then the equi-
librium is generically inefficient (due to the heterogeneity in markups implied by double marginalization)
even if every producer charges the same markup.
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In the special case where some fraction δi in industry i are flexible, then
d log C = d log M − b′(I − δΩ˜)−1δ(α˜d log M − d log A).
Proposition 4.2 is simple to interpret: for productivity shocks, the impact of a shock
is the same as one in a model with flexible prices, but where productivity shocks affect
only some fraction δi of each industry i’s costs, or in other words, productivity shocks are
attenuated by some weight δi at each industry. The impact of monetary policy shocks on
output is given by 1 − b′(I − δΩ˜)−1δα˜, or the total share of value-added which is sticky in
the economy.
Crucially, information about elasticities of substitution and changes in allocative effi-
ciency disappear from these calculations. This is due to assumption of infinitely elastic
labor supply. In this model, labor supply moves exactly in such a way as to offset changes
in allocative efficiency, so that output fluctuations boil down to only how the productivity
shocks travel from suppliers into consumer prices. Hence, although output responses
can easily be determined without information on elasticities of substitution, allocative
efficiency is changing in this environment, and is given by
d log C − d log L = λ˜′ d log A − λ˜′es d logµ − d log Λ,
which is nonzero.48
We now turn our attention to an application of our results. We calibrate a version
of our quantitative model from Section 4, but augmented with a labor-leisure choice,
and a Frisch elasticity of labor supply of ν = 1/2 , which is broadly consistent with the
recommendation of Chetty et al. (2011). We create two copies of each firm in our sample,
one copy has sticky prices while the other has flexible prices. We then use Proposition 4.1
to compute the impact of monetary policy shocks and firm-level productivity shocks.
Monetary Policy Shocks
In Table 4, we show the response of output and aggregate TFP for a shock to the money
supply. We consider different specifications of the model with different elasticities of
substitution. For each specification, we also consider some speculative scenarios where
48The fact that changes in allocative efficiency are not required to compute the changes in output is a
generic property of infinitely elastic labor supply, and does not depend on parametric assumptions about
the production functions, see footnote (29) for more details.
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the flexible firms have slightly higher or lower markups than the sticky firms (keeping the
average constant).
We find that the movements in aggregate TFP, which are purely caused by changes
in allocative efficiency, can become very large if the elasticity of substitution across firms
is high, and if average markups are not the same between the flexible and sticky firms.
The size and sign of these movements depend crucially on the correlation between price
rigidity and markups. These results suggest that empirical work on understanding the
correlation between microeconomic price rigidities and the levels of markups could be of
great importance.49 They also suggest that the literature on the New Keynesian model, by
assuming that the steady-state is efficient, and by assuming away correlations between
price rigidities and levels of markups, could potentially be missing important first-order
effects.50
Comparing the benchmark model to the one-sector model, we also recover the famous
insight by Basu (1995) that intermediate goods can increase stickiness. If intermediate
inputs are sticky, then flexible firms adjust their prices less in response to shocks. The
degree of amplification caused by the intermediate-input share is hump-shaped in the
fraction of firms δ that have sticky prices. In the limit, as all firms become sticky, the
intermediate input share becomes irrelevant, and the same occurs when all firms become
flexible. Here we show that these effects are stronger when the fraction of sticky prices
is 20% (roughly corresponding to a horizon of 5 quarters) than if it is 50% (roughly
corresponding to a horizon of 2 quarters).51
49The sign of this correlation is not ex-ante obvious. In models where the price elasticity of demand
is not constant, the pass-through of costs to markups can depend on the level of the markup, so that the
desired markups of firms with high markups are less sensitive to changes in costs. In the presence of price-
adjustment costs, this means that high markup firms will have stickier prices (see Gopinath and Itskhoki,
2011, 2010; Atkeson and Burstein, 2008; Kimball, 1995). On the other hand, in a Calvo model where the
markups are uncorrelated with stickiness on impact, in response to an expansion in the money supply,
firms that do not adjust their markups for longer will over time have lower effective markups, inducing a
negative correlation between stickiness and markups. Studying these sorts of effects requires a dynamic
model however, and we leave this for future work.
50Typically, second-order effects on allocative efficiency are taken into account only in the computation
of welfare, but not in the computation of the equilibrium allocation.
51Relatedly, Nakamura and Steinsson (2010) and Pasten et al. (2016) have emphasized that heterogeneity
in the frequency of price changes across industries is also quantitatively important. This is mostly because,
even in the basic New Keynesian model with a trivial input-output structure, the mapping between the
frequency of price changes and the degree of monetary non-neutrality is convex, and so for a given average
frequency of price changes, increasing dispersion in the frequency of price changes increases monetary
non-neutrality. This is an important dimension of heterogeneity that, for now, we abstract away from in our
quantitative examples.
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δ = 0.5 Benchmark CD + CES CD + CD One Sector
Uncorrelated (0.154, 0.005) (0.164, 0.017) (0.164, 0.017) (0.125, 0.000)
Sticky High Markup (0.307, 0.204) (0.319, 0.219) (0.181, 0.039) (0.250, 0.167)
Flex High Markup (0.034,-0.153) (0.041,-0.143) (0.147,-0.006) (0.023,-0.136)
δ = 0.2 Benchmark CD + CES CD + CD One Sector
Uncorrelated (0.091, 0.003) (0.0963, 0.012) (0.096, 0.012) (0.058, 0.000)
Sticky High Markup (0.220, 0.182) (0.223, 0.186) (0.106, 0.024) (0.142, 0.118)
Flex High Markup (-0.015.,-0.143) (-0.008,-0.133) (0.086,-0.003) (-0.017,-0.108)
Table 4: The elasticity of output and aggregate TFP with respect to monetary policy
shocks (d log C/d log M,d log TFP/d log M) for two different Calvo parameters δ. The
parameter δ is the fraction of each industry with sticky prices. We show the results for
the benchmark model, a Cobb-Douglas specification that keeps ξ = 8, but sets all other
elasticities of substitution to one (CD + CES), a Cobb-Douglas specification that sets all
elasticities equal to one (CD + CD), and a single-industry model with a value-added
production function. The first row is where the sticky and flexible firms are identical. The
second row is where the sticky firms have markups that are 5% larger than the industry
average and the flexible firms have markups that are 5% smaller than the industry average.
The third row reverses this, and has sticky firms with 5% lower and flexible firms with
5% higher markups than the industry average.
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Productivity Shocks
In general, we can decompose the effect on output, from a productivity shock, into three
components: (1) the “pure” technology effect captured by the cost-based Domar weight,
(2) changes in allocative efficiency, and (3) changes in quantity of factors supplied. In the
context of a model with sticky prices, the second effect is subtle, since markups adjust
in response to a productivity shock to ensure that sticky prices do not adjust. In Figure
8, we plot the allocative efficiency component of the response relative to the total output
response for firm-level productivity shocks, as a histogram. We color the flexible and
sticky priced firms differently. We see that changes in allocative efficiency, which are
typically neglected by the positive literature on nominal rigidities, are sizable as a fraction
of the total output response. Furthermore, we find that the sign on this term changes.
For flexible firms, the “pure” technology impact of the productivity shock is amplified by
improvements in allocative efficiency, while for sticky priced firms, the opposite is true.
In Figure 9, we plot the histogram of the output responses to firm-level productivity
shocks relative to the sales shares of the affected firms. Since the sales share gives the
output response in the competitive model, we can think of this as measure the degree
of amplification or attenuation of productivity shocks relative to a model with perfectly
flexible firms and perfect competition. We see that the impact of shocks is more attenuated
when the firm is sticky than when it is flexible, but the effect is not necessarily zero, even
when the firm has sticky prices. This is because of the upstream reallocation that happens
in the case when a firm with sticky prices receives a productivity shock. On the whole, the
model with nominal rigidities attenuates shocks relative to the competitive flexible model
(most of the mass in the histogram is to the left of 1), but this is by no means universal,
and there are some firms for whom shocks are amplified.
Finally, in Figure 10, we plot the response of the shock on output when the firm is
sticky relative to when the firm is flexible. Since all the mass it to the left of 1, we can
conclude that the flexible firm always affects output more than the sticky firm, but of
course, the degree of attenuation is highly dispersed.
5 Robustness and Extensions
In this section, we discuss how our results could be extended to address some limitations
of our analysis: the absence of fixed costs, the lack of entry, and the importance of
nonlinearities. These issues introduce additional forces and mechanisms into the model,
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Figure 8: The change in allocative efficiency relative to the change in output for produc-
tivity shocks to the firms in Compustat with sticky and flexible prices. We set ν = 1/2,
and use GP markups.














Figure 9: Response of output for productivity shocks to the sticky and flexible firms in
Compustat relative to the response in a fully competitive model. We set ν = 1/2, and use
GP markups.
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Figure 10: Response of output relative to a firm-level productivity shock for the sticky
firm relative to the flexible firm. We set ν = 1/2, and use GP markups.
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and which we plan to squarely focus on in future work. However, we show here that
the intuitions gleaned from the basic framework continue to be useful in analyzing these
more complex models.
5.1 Fixed Costs
To add fixed overhead costs to the model, we need to separate variable cost from total
cost. Under these conditions Ω˜ becomes total-variable-cost based rather than total-cost
based. It is the matrix whose i jth element is
Ω˜i j =
d log Ci





where VCi is i’s total variable cost rather than i’s total costs. Then we have
d log C = λ˜′ d log A − λ˜d logµ + d H(Λ˜,Λ). (32)
where Λ is the share of income going to each factor including the payments to the infra-
marginal fixed costs, but the cost-based Domar weights λ˜ and Λ˜ are constructed using the
variable-cost based Ω˜.52
5.2 Entry
If firms are earning positive economic profits, we might expect that this would induce
entry and competition. In this section, we extend our basic results to cover the case
where there is free entry. First, we establish that our results can easily be applied to
cases where entry is “wasteful.” Typically, entry can be economically meaningful due
to several reasons: (1) it increases product variety; (2) it reduces markups; (3) it selects
52With fixed costs, the interpretation of allocative efficiency as the gap between the passive allocation
and the general equilibrium allocation still applies, but the passive allocation is no longer locally the same
as general equilibrium when there are no frictions. The reason is that the passive allocation would send
resources to the users of the fixed cost, even though the marginal benefit is zero. However, we can change
the definition of the passive allocation so that it nets out fixed costs first (and hence becomes equivalent to
general equilibrium when there are no frictions). Under this modification, the change in allocative efficiency
is given by
d log Cp − d log C = (λˆ − λ˜)′ d log A − λ˜′ d logµ + d H(Λ˜,Λ), (33)
where λˆ = b′(I −ϕ−1Ω˜)−1 and ϕ is a diagonal matrix whose iith element is the share industry i’s output that
is not used for fixed costs in the initial allocation. If the equilibrium is efficient, then (33) is always zero. For
reference, λ˜ = b′(I − Ω˜)−1 and λ = b′(I −Ω)−1.
61
the most productive firms; (4) it counters decreasing returns to scale at the firm level.
If we assume that firms have constant-returns-to-scale production functions, are ex-ante
identical, markups/wedges are exogenous, and there is no returns to product variety,
then entry is entirely socially wasteful.53 Under these conditions, our results survive
unchanged.
Next, we provide a simple case where we can micro-found our industry-level model
with constant-returns industry cost functions using a model that has entry and decreasing
returns to scale a the firm level. Here, channels (1), (2), and (3) are still shut off, but (4)
is operating. Under these conditions, our results for the impact of productivity shocks
survive unchanged. Finally, we sketch how a model which potentially allows for all four
channels outlined above behaves. Here, our results connect to those of Baqaee (2016),
who studies network economies with free entry and external economies of scale.
No External Economies
We start with the case where the entry margin has no effect on the marginal productivity
of the industry so that mechanisms (1), (2), (3) and (4) are shut off.
















so that firms have constant returns on the margin, and Ak is an industry level TFP. To enter,
firms pay a fixed entry cost. After entry, each firm draws an idiosyncratic markup mi and
productivity zi from some distribution Φ(z,m). There is also an industry level markup
µk. The scaling term M
−1/εk
k is introduced to neutralize love for variety effects and thereby
ensure that there are no external economies of scale.
Proposition 5.1 (No External Economies). Suppose that there is free entry subject to fixed costs,
53A constrained social planner would drive the mass of entrants in each industry to zero.
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= −λ˜k + d H(Λ˜,Λ)d logµk .
This set up allows us to span the basic framework in, for example, Autor et al. (2017),
who argue that the decline in the labor share in the US in recent times is due to an increase
in the size of low-labor-share firms.54 They consider a model with entry and where
labor intensity falls with the scale of operation because of overhead labor costs. The
mechanism Autor et al. (2017) emphasize is an increase in the industry-level elasticity of
substitution, whereby more productive firms are able to capture more demand over time.
Our interpretation, consistent with their empirical evidence, is that low-labor share firms
charge higher markups, and that these markups are part of the reason why they have a
low labor share. Our results in Section 4 indicate that these changes in the composition
of firms within industries have increased aggregate productivity by improving allocative
efficiency.
Constant External Economies
While the no-external-economies model described above allows us to accommodate entry,
it does so within a very restrictive set up. Now, we sketch a version of the model where,
due to decreasing returns to scale at the firm-level, free entry is not socially wasteful. We
turn on mechanism (4) but keep (1), (2), and (3) off.
Although individual firms have decreasing returns to scale, industries have constant
returns to scale. This simple model can microfound the use of constant-returns-to-scale
industry level cost functions, and thereby allows our results to go through unchanged for
productivity shocks, as long as we assume that each entrant in industry k has access to
a homothetic production function, that all producers charge the same markup, and that
overhead costs are paid in units of the industry good.
Proposition 5.2 (Constant External Economies). Suppose that there is free entry subject to
fixed entry costs. In addition, suppose that entrants in each industry charge the same markup and
54Hartman-Glaser et al. (2016) also document this fact and offer a different explanation based on implicit
contracts between firms and workers
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have access to the same homothetic production function, and each entrant pays a fixed cost of entry







d log Λ f
d log Ak
.
This extends our results for productivity shocks to an economy with entry. Unfor-
tunately, the results for markup/wedge shocks do not apply any longer since a change
in markups changes the scale of operations of firms, and these changes have associated
efficiency changes that cannot be tracked in the same way.
Increasing External Economies
Finally, we sketch how our framework would relate to models with richer heterogeneity
and entry properties by turning on mechanisms (1), (3), and (4).55 In particular, we allow
for the possibility that entry can induce increasing returns to scale at the industry level,
where the industry becomes more productive as more firms enter.56
To deal with the possibility of decreasing returns to scale at the firm-level, we introduce
“fictitious” fixed factors, and assume that each entrant in an industry may use a fixed factor.




where Ak is industry TFP, z(i) is individual TFP, and rk(i) is the wage paid to the fixed
factor. We also allow for fixed overhead costs on top of the entry costs, which firms pay
after observing the realization of their markup and productivity if they decide to be active
(see below), thereby creating room for selection effects.
Index producers in industry k by i in such a way that their idiosyncratic productivity
zk(i) is weakly increasing, and suppose that i is distributed according to the distribution
55We could also allow for mechanism (2) with endogenous markups in a model with Cournot competition,
or with demand curves with non-constant elasticities. The formula would feature extra terms having to do
with the elasticity of the markups to the shocks.
56Baqaee (2016) shows that, even within the confines of a tightly parameterized model, these forces can
significantly alter the propagation and amplification of shocks.
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where ik denotes the cutoff below which firms that have paid the entry cost decide not
to be active in order not to pay the fixed overhead cost. Movements in this cutoff drive
the strength of selection effects and the external economies of scale arising from love for
variety effects.
Proposition 5.3 (Increasing External Economies). Suppose that there is free entry, fixed entry
costs, and fixed overhead costs paid after productivity and markup draws conditional on operating,





































d log i j
d logµk
,
where f indexes the set of all factors including the “fictitious” fixed factors.
The model of Baqaee (2016) becomes a special case of this setup. Proposition 5.3 shows
that by incorporating “fictitious” factors, and hence separating profits due to distortions
from competitive rents from decreasing returns, we can extend our results to a much
more general class of models going even beyond neoclassical production by allowing for
increasing returns to scale at the macroeconomic level.
Importantly, allowing for increasing returns makes the “pure” technology effect of a
shock endogenous, and this endogenous response of productivity is what the final (and
new) term in Proposition 5.3 accounts for. There are two reasons why technology becomes
endogenous: first, an increase in the mass of entrants improves the productivity of firms
through its effect on product variety. Second, an increase in the mass of entrants can
change the distribution of productivity in each industry, since the change in cutoff value
at which firms enter the market changes. Interestingly, we see that these cut-off values
for the productivity and their derivatives are sufficient statistics for understanding the
first-order impact of the shocks. Analyzing this model in any more detail and expressing
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these cutoff values and their derivatives as a function of the structural microeconomic
parameters of the model is well beyond the scope of this paper, but we pursue it in
ongoing work.
5.3 Nonlinear Impact of Shocks
Another limitation of our results is that we neglect nonlinearities. As discussed by Baqaee
and Farhi (2017), models with production networks can respond very nonlinearly to
productivity shocks. We plan to extend these results to inefficient economies in full
generality, but as a first step, here, we stipulate some conditions under which we can
directly leverage these results to inefficient economies. In particular, we show that the
amplification of negative shocks due to complementarities emphasized in Baqaee and
Farhi (2017) can also work to amplify the negative effects of misallocation.
Consider the quantitative parametric model in Section 4. Let δk(i), µk(i), and Ak(i)
















Define the efficiency of each firm i in industry k to be ek(i) = 1/µk(i). Consider a
transformation ek(i) = tk + (1 − tk)ek(i) which shrinks dispersion in markups relative to its
steady-state value µk(i) = 1/ek(i). This transformation keeps µk = 1/ek constant. Define the
revenue-based Domar weight of industry k by λk.






















with d log Ak/d log tk ≥ 0.57
57We typically also have d2 log Ak/d log t2k ≥ 0.
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Hence, increases in the dispersion of markups, which keep the harmonic average of
markups constant, are isomorphic to negative productivity shocks in a model which is
efficient at the industry level. Hence, shocks which increase markup dispersion in an
industry can have outsized nonlinear effects on output, if those industries are macro-
complementary with other industries in the sense defined by Baqaee and Farhi (2017) so
that d logλk/d log Ak < 0.
This helps flesh out the insight in Jones (2011) that complementarities can interact with
distortions to generate large reductions in output, and that these can be quantitatively
important enough to explain the large differences in cross-country incomes. Given the
examples in Baqaee and Farhi (2017), it should be clear how misallocation in a key industry
like energy production can significantly reduce output through macro-complementarities.
Investigating these nonlinear forces more systematically is an interesting exercise that we
leave for future work.
6 Conclusion
We provide a non-parametric framework for analyzing and aggregating productivity and
wedge shocks in a general equilibrium economy with arbitrary neoclassical production.
Our results generalize the results of Solow (1957) and Hulten (1978) to economies with
distortions. We show that, locally, the impact of a shock can be decomposed into a “pure”
technology effect and an allocative efficiency effect. The latter can be measured non-
parametrically using information about the wedges and the movements in factor income
shares.
We apply our findings to the US, where our measure of wedges correspond to markups.
We find that from 1997-2015, allocative efficiency in the US accounts for about half of
aggregate TFP growth. We also find that the gains from reducing markups have increased
since 1997, that eliminating markups will increase aggregate TFP by around 40% (up
to a second order approximation). These numbers are substantially higher than classic
estimates like those of Harberger (1954).
Although our results are comparative statics that take productivity and markups as
exogenous, they can be used, in conjunction with the chain rule, to study models where
productivity or markups are themselves endogenous. As an example, we show how our
framework could be applied to analyze the effects of productivity shocks and monetary
policy shocks in models with sticky prices (where the effective markup of sticky firms
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is endogenous). In particular, we show how to characterize the oft-neglected potential
effects of monetary policy shocks on TFP.
We end by speculating about some future areas for research, namely extending our
analysis to allow for entry, increasing external economies, and nonlinearities. We view it
as a very promising research direction to combine of our framework with more detailed
industrial-organization models of market structure and imperfect competition, innova-
tion, or more generally structural models of frictions in markets for credit, factors, and
goods. We are pursuing these directions in ongoing work.
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A Additional Figures











Figure 11: Decomposition of the Solow Residual using LI markups.
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Figure 12: Decomposition of the Solow Residual using DE markups.
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